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Abstract 
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) represented an attempt by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) member countries to create 
a comprehensive multilateral legal framework governing foreign investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment. After a three-year effort, negotiations for the MAl collapsed in December 
1998. Considerable support remains however, for creating global rules on foreign investment. 
The issues of possible loss of nation states' sovereignty in favour of the Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) and the possible loss of developing states' sovereignty and flexibility in 
drawing their own development agenda as a result of the MAl's implementation are at the heart 
of the debates over the MAL 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) represents an influential body of economic 
theory that tries to incorporate the study of institutions into mainstream neoclassical economics 
and to investigate the implications for economic development and reform. The development of 
NIE from a theory of firm and contracts (Williamson, 1996) to a theory of global development 
and reform (North, 1990a) extends the neoclassical orthodoxy and brings relevant theoretical 
insights for, the logic behind and the implications deriving from, the MAl. The theoretical 
underpinnings provided by NIE to international agreements, such as the MAl, have been 
generally neglected. 
This thesis argues that the NIE is a possible theoretical foundation for the MAL This is 
argued by looking at the commonalties in terms ofNIE's and the MAl's development and policy 
implications and by analyzing NIE's contribution to the official discourse on development and 
reform. First, this thesis argues that the MAl and NIE did not develop in a vacuum. They 
developed as social and intellectual reactions for dealing with significant changes in the world 
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economy, particularly the increasing importance ofTNCs and ofFDl within the context of 
persistent disparities between countries' levels of economic development. Second, this thesis 
argues that the MAl's logic and policy implications directly relate to NIE's recommendation for 
development and reform. Third, this thesis argues that NIE has helped redesign the official 
discourse on development and reform with FDl and global rules on investment gaining an 
increasing developmental role. 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on the MAl and NIE in a number 
of ways. The contribution of this thesis to the MAl literature is in its insistence of (i) the need for 
clearer identification of the theoretical logic behind the MAl or future similar agreements; (ii) the 
relevance of any such agreement for developing countries; (iii) the need to oppose any such 
agreement not only by arguing that the outcomes will be undesirable but also that the underlying 
theory - in this case the NIE- is also flawed; and finally (iv) the need to analyze the MAl not 
just as an individual project that could determine the dynamics of the foreign investment 
transactions but as a fundamental part of an ongoing process of building a global institutional 
framework that determines the distribution of rights and power in the global economy. This 
thesis contributes to the NIE literature by (i) advancing the argument for a complementary Oliver 
Williamson- Douglass North framework and (ii) analysing the line of departure between NIE 
and neoclassical economics (NEO) in answering fundamental theoretical questions. Lastly, but 
not least, this thesis contributes to the theory and practice of international political economy by 
reinforcing the opinion that dominant social practices (MAl) are sustained and constituted by 
mainstream theoretical discourses (NIE). 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze New Institutional Economics (hereafter, 
NIE) as a possible theoretical foundation for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(hereafter, MAl). The MAl represented an attempt by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development's (OECD) member countries to create a comprehensive 
multilateral legal framework governing foreign investment1, particularly foreign direct 
investmene (hereafter, FDI). The official negotiations within the OECD had begun in 
June 1995. The MAl was originally scheduled to be completed and signed by May 1996. 
However, as the complex negotiations lagged, the process was delayed. After a three-year 
effort, negotiations for the MAl collapsed in December 1998. The MAl is defined in this 
study as the 24 April 1998 draft encompassing the MAl text and the Commentary to the 
MAitexe. 
1 Foreign investment usually refers to foreign private investment covering foreign direct investment, 
foreign portfolio investment and other foreign investments (for example, bank loans). Foreign direct 
investment refers to investment "reflecting the lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct 
investor) in an entity resident in another economy (direct investment enterprise)" (IMF, 1995, p. xxxvi). It 
consists of the sum of: equity capital (new equity purchased or acquired by parent companies in overseas 
firms they are considered to control, including the establishment of new subsidiaries), reinvested earnings 
of controlled firms, and other intercompany transactions like loans from parent companies to controlled 
firms . Portfolio investment refers, in principle, to investment that provides financial capital to an enterprise 
in a country other than that of the investor, but does not involve any management control in the enterprise 
(UNCTAD, 1998). 
2 Most of the literature on MAl tends to use the concepts of foreign investment and foreign direct 
investment interchangeably when referring to MAl's coverage of investment. This ignores the importance 
of other foreign investment types covered by the MAl provisions but not considered FDI per se. The 
distinction is important in that portfolio investments, for example, present a much higher volatility than FDI 
and a much lower commitment to long-term development of the host economy. Hence, they are more 
susceptible to cause macroeconomic imbalances, particularly currency crises, and have been traditionally 
given different, more restrictive legal treatment than FDI. • 
3 The MAl text consolidates the text of the agreement considered in the course of the last MAl negotiations. 
The commentary to the text was issued separately and it contains further clarifications on the content of the 
MAl text. Both documents are available at: http://www.oecd.org//daf/cmis/mailnegtext.htm 
NIE represents an influential body of economic theory that tries to incorporate the 
study of institutions into mainstream neoclassical economics (hereafter, NE0)4 and to 
investigate the implications for economic development and reform (North, 1995). It 
evolved on two main, relatively separate, theoretical branches (Williamson, 1996). The 
first branch applies a top-down macro-perspective to the study of institutions. It is 
concerned with the political and legal rules of the game and is usually associated with the 
works ofDouglass North. The second branch applies a bottom-up micro-perspective to 
the study of institutions. It deals with firm and market modes of contract and organization 
and is usually associated with the works of Oliver Williamson. NIE is defined in this 
study as the comparative study of institutions resulting from the work of Williamson 
(1983,1987,1993,1996), North (1981,1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1995), North and Weingast R. 
Barry (1989) and Lance Davis and North (1971). Institutions are defined as either 
institutional environments or institutional arrangements where the crucial distinctions 
between them are that: 
the institutional environment is the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules 
that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution. [ ... ]An institutional 
arrangement is an arrangement between economic units that governs the ways in which these 
units can cooperate and/or compete. It ... [can] provide a structure within which its members 
can cooperate ... or [it can] provide a mechanism that can effect a change in laws or property 
rights (Davis & North, 1971, pp. 6-7). 
Constitutions, laws, norms of conduct and ideologies are components of the 
institutional environment. Contracts, markets, firms, and polities are examples of 
institutional arrangements. Within the NIE literature, some align Williamson and North 
4 Neoclassical economics refers in this study to the economic body of theory primordially based on the 
Walrasian equilibrium model. This model envisions the world as a perfect competitive market in which 
large number of autonomous, fully informed entities with profit-maximizing behavior voluntarily exchange 
homogenous goods and efficiently achieve the desired ends. Institutions are exogenous to this economic 
model and do not influence agents behavior or the economic outcomes. 
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under the same NIE perspective (Bardhan, 1989; Harriss-White, 1995; Stein,1995; 
Williamson, 1996). Others distinguish between Williamson's and North's works treating 
them as separate perspectives (Nabli & Nugent, 1989; Groenewegen, Kerstholt and 
Nagelkerke, 1995; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1996). In building a representative NIE 
theoretical framework, this thesis found it more useful to focus on the common logic and 
complementarity between North's and Williamson's works rather than on their 
differences. This approach does not necessary dismiss the claims of differences between 
the two theoretical branches of the NIE, but it points out that, in some cases, the study of 
institutions can be better informed by a complementary Williamson-North NIE 
framework rather than by the individual theoretical work of its parts. 
Although there has been a lot of attention accorded to both the MAl and NIE, a 
clear intellectual connection between them has not been spelled out. The controversial 
debates on the MAl and the NIE took place on relatively separate fronts . Two different 
but interconnected debates emerged within the MAl literature. The first debate (hereafter, 
the state/firm debate) refers to general opinions on the possibility of a loss of state 
sovereignty in favor of the modem transnational corporation5 (hereafter, TNC) as a result 
of the MAl's implementation. For the MAl proponents, the potential loss of state 
sovereignty as a direct result of the MAl's implementation is overstated. National 
sovereignty represents an "outdated illusion" of voters unaware of the "degree to which 
their well-being is dependent on economic ties forged by investment from other 
countries" (Rashish, 1996). The MAl should be read as an efficient partnership between 
the OECD governments and the TNCs expected to enhance the efficient utilization of 
5 A transnational corporation represents a firm which conducts its trade and production internationally, 
compound from a domestic parent firm and several affiliates. 
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economic resources, the creation of employment opportunities and the improvement of 
living standards. For the MAl's critics, this agreement would constrain governments' 
ability to impose obligations on TNCs to serve local economic, environmental or social 
needs related to their investment and hence would decrease the state's sovereignty. TNCs' 
activities could be contrary to social, cultural, environmental and local economic needs 
and hence incompatible with national sustainable development. 
The second debate (hereafter, the state/state debate) refers to particular opinions 
on the possibility of loss of developing states' sovereignty and political flexibility in 
drawing their own development strategies, as a result of the implementation of an MAl-
type agreement. For the MAl's proponents, the MAl represents a general set of fair play 
rules for governments regulating foreign investment transactions. It would not 
discriminate but rather help developing countries that lack credible political commitments 
to secure systems of property rights by reducing the uncertainty of foreign investors and 
thereby to attract FDI. For the MAl's critics, this agreement would affect developing 
countries' sovereignty and political flexibility in drawing their own development strategy, 
by locking them into one model of development. 
The state/state debate has been relatively less explored by MAl analysts, with 
attention being focussed on the OECD negotiating countries. By drawing special 
attention to the possible implications of the MAl's for developing countries this study 
intends to contribute to filling this void. Although the MAl was originally conceived as 
an OECD initiative, it was clear that some developing countries were interested in 
unilaterally joining it and some had been given observer status. The way in which 
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hi/multilateral treaties are used as springboards for incorporation into WTO talks6 also 
suggests that developing countries might also be involved at some point if the MAl or 
similar agreements do rise again. 
This thesis looks at the NIE as a possible theoretical foundation for the MAl. 
With the award of a Nobel Prize in economics in 1991 to Professor Ronald Coase and 
then in 1993 to Professor Douglass C. North, two of the main scholars behind the NIE, 
the NIE emerged as an 'accepted' alternative paradigm to NEO. The NIE is supportive of 
NEO's framework but claims to introduce major modifications to NEO's initial 
theoretical assumptions and policy implications. The exact distinction between the two 
paradigms remains subject to debate. This study does not necessarily reject other 
theoretical contributions to the MAl but rather views as necessary a firmer grasp of the 
theoretical underpinnings of what exactly the NIE brings to the MAl debates that is 
overlooked by the NEO. By showing how the NIE is relevant here, I would hope that my 
work would be of use to those working at a higher level of abstraCtion. This is 
particularly important because the theoretical underpinnings provided by NIE to 
international agreements such as the MAl have been generally neglected. 
This thesis argues that the NIE is a possible theoretical foundation for the MAL 
This is argued by looking at the commonalties in terms ofNIE's and the MAl's 
development and policy implications and by analyzing NIE's contribution to the "official 
discourse on development and reform" 7. First, this thesis argues that the MAl and NIE 
6 See for example the Information Technology Agreement in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
which formed the basis of the WTO text in Singapore in 1996. 
7 "The official discourse on development and reform" refers to the content of the 1987, 1994, 1997, 
1998/1999 and 1999/2000 World Development Reports (WDRs) published by the World Bank. In their role 
as the World Bank's annual intellectual flagship publication, the WDRs have, for more than 20 years, 
reflected the official mainstream discourse on development and reform. The WDRs have been previously 
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did not develop in a vacuum. They developed as social and intellectual reactions for 
dealing with significant changes in the world economy, particularly the increasing 
importance ofTNCs and ofFDI within the context of persistent disparities between 
countries' levels of economic development. Second, this thesis argues that MAl's logic 
and policy implications directly relate to NIE's recommendation for development and 
reform. Third, this thesis argues that NIE has helped redesign the official discourse on 
development and reform with FDI and global rules on investment gaining an increasing 
developmental role. 
2. Outline of thesis 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The purpose of this first chapter is to 
introduce the objective, concepts and methodological framework of this thesis. The 
purpose of this chapter is also to show that the MAl and NIE did not develop in a vacuum 
and that a possible intellectual relation is relevant in the current empirical, theoretical and 
international legal developments in the field ofFDI. 
The purpose of the second chapter is to present an overview of the MAl text, 
together with the main debates about its possible implications, the state/state and the 
state/firm debates. A detailed presentation of the MAl content is justified by the large 
number of controversies in the interpretation of the text. Without claims for an exhaustive 
analysis of all the possible implications emerging from the implementation of the 
agreement, an analysis of the main elements of the last negotiated draft is attempted. As 
used as an indicator of the intellectual relation between development theories and the official discourse on 
development and reform by Colin Leys (1996), in his account of"The Rise and Fall off Development 
Theory". 
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previously mentioned, there are strong reasons to expect that any future MAl-type 
agreement would directly concern both developed and developing countries. Hence, the 
focus of this chapter is on the main themes of concern for both developed and developing 
countries. 
The purpose of the third chapter is twofold. First, this chapter advances a 
complementary Williamson-North NIB framework. This theoretical framework will be 
used for analyzing NIB' s theoretical underpinnings of the MAl in chapter four. Second, 
this chapter explores NIB's position vis-a-vis NEO. The choice of examining NIB in 
contrast to NEO throughout this chapter is based on two reasons. First, by showing here 
how NIB differs from NEO in terms of practical implications and how this relates to the 
MAI debates, I intend to underline the importance of analyzing NIB's theoretical 
underpinnings to the MAI as opposed to a more general NBO approach. Second, the line 
of departure of NIB from NBO in answering fundamental theoretical questions is, I 
believe, the place where the seeds of the NIB's theoretical contribution to the MAl reside. 
By drawing this line in chapter three, I am building the logical grounds for my next 
arguments in chapter four. 
The fourth chapter builds on all previous chapters by pooling together the core 
argument of the thesis. It starts by analyzing the commonalties between NIB's and MAl's 
possible practical implications for development and reform. The state/firm and state/state 
debates summarized in chapter two are reexamined here through the lens of the NIE 
framework developed in chapter three. The chapter continues by tracing the contribution 
of the same NIE framework to the official discourse on development and reform. This 
analysis brings additional support for the hypothesis that NIB represents a possible 
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theoretical foundation for the MAl. The fourth chapter concludes by reviewing the 
hypothesis, results and implications of this theoretical exercise for the study of the MAl 
and future global treaties on foreign investment. As a final point, the limitations of this 
study are discussed and areas for future related research are proposed. 
3. FDI and NIE: an historical perspective 
3.1. The changing face of the world economy and the role of the FDI 
One way to think about the world economy is from the point of view of the 
totality of exchange transactions undertaken in the world for production or trade 
purposes. The decisions underlying these transactions with a bearing on economic growth 
and competitiveness - such as decisions to invest and innovate- have traditionally been 
discussed as the product of national firms under the auspices of their national states 
(UNCT AD, 1994). With the significant growth of cross-border transactions registered in 
the post-war period, these perceptions began to change. 
Official estimates show that total world trade in 1997 represented 14 times the 
level ofworld trade in 1950. Further, while between 1948 and 1997 world output grew at 
an annual average per year of 3. 8 per cent, merchandise exports grew at a 6 per cent rate 
(WTO, 1998, p. 1). These developments, particularly the fact that trade has grown faster 
than output, represent for some the extent of increased international economic integration 
ofthe world economy, due to the internationalization of production and the increase in 
cross-border transactions. 
Of the different types of transactions the flows ofFDI have particularly increased, 
surpassing the growth in trade or domestic production. During the period 1983-89, FDI 
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outflows "have increased at the unprecedented rate of growth of 29 per cent a year, three 
times faster than that of the growth of exports and four times that of the growth of the 
world output" (UNCTAD, 1991, p. 3). Other official reports estimate that over the 1973-
1995 period, the value of annual foreign investment outflows multiplied more than 
twelve times (from $25 billion to $315 billion), while the value of merchandise exports 
multiplied approximately eight and a halftimes (from $575 billion to $4900 billion) 
(Drabek, 1998, p. 4). In 1997, the ratio of inward plus outward FDI stocks to world Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew twice as fast as the ratio of world imports and exports to 
world GDP (UNCT AD, 1998, p. xvii), suggesting that the FDI continued to deepen the 
integration of the world economy. 
The increasing role ofFDI has important implications for the state of the world 
economy. This is mainly because of four factors . First, as opposed to international trade 
(the import and export of goods and service), FDI covers any cross border transaction 
aimed at acquiring or expanding corporate control of productive assets (Froot, 1993). 
Hence, it usually implies an exchange of domestic for foreign control of production 
capacities. This means that what characterizes today's world economy is an increased 
internationalization of the control of previously domestically controlled factors of 
production. 
Second, over 90 per cent of the outward stocks and flows ofFDI are conducted by 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTAD, 1995, p.7). Even within the TNCs' universe the 
control over FDI transactions is highly concentrated. The world's largest 100 TNCs (not 
including those in banking and finance) were estimated by the United Nations 
Conference ofTrade and Development (UNCTAD), (1995, p. 19) to account in 1993 for 
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about one-third of the combined outward FDI of their countries of origin. The source of 
FDI and respectively the home for the parent firms of these 100 TNC as well as most 
other TNCs, is the developed world. The United States remains the main source and 
destination ofFDI in the world. Japan and the European Union (EU) represent the other 
main foreign direct investors. The destination ofFDI, initially concentrated within the 
developed world, began to shift at an increasing rate towards the developing world. In 
1997, developing countries' level ofFDI inflows was twice the level they received in 
1993 and tenfold the level in 1985 (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 16). The targeted developing 
countries are the ones that recently liberalized FDI and implemented privatization 
programs open to foreign participation. This implies that the current transfer of control of 
productive assets is taking place within the developed world but increasingly shifting 
from the developing to the developed world. It also implies that the process is led by a 
few large transnational corporations that take advantage of the new opportunities for 
profitable investment in both developed and developing countries as countries open up 
their economies to foreign investment. • 
Third, during the post Second World War period, a different but interrelated type 
of international transactions, namely intra-firm cross-border transactions, started nesting 
within FDI transactions at an increasing rate. These represent the transactions undertaken 
by a TNC in organizing under unified governance - between the parent firm and its 
foreign affiliates - its processes of production and trade. The TNCs' intra-firm 
transactions can take the form of cross-border intra-firm trade, cooperative intra-firm 
agreements, non-equity forms ofTNC involvement (licensing, turnkey agreements, 
franchising, management contracts) or subcontracting (UNCTAD, 1994). In 1992, for 
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example, only about one-third of the world's international transactions were not 
associated with TNC's intra-firm transactions (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 39). Analyzing the 
1992 data, the 1995 World Investment Report remarked that "in the case ofthe United 
States, whose firms are among the leaders in the internationalization process (and for 
which better data are available) ... [ . . . ] ... four out of five dollars received for goods and 
services sold abroad by United States firms are actually earned from goods and services 
produced by their foreign affiliates or sold to them"(lbid., p. 39). This means that another 
characteristic oftoday's world economy is the process of"internalization" of transactions 
within the TNC or the removal of the transactions from the realm of the market to the 
realm of the corporate firm. This leads to a further increase in the overall control of TNCs 
over the process of production and trade in the world economy. 
Fourth, if in the past greenfield investment was the rule, today the vast majority of 
FDI is done through mergers and acquisitions (Froot, 1993, UNCTAD, 1995, 1998). The 
value of majority purchase cross-border mergers and acquisitions8 (hereafter, M&A) in 
relation to total FDI inflows rose from 49 per cent in 1996 to 58 per cent in 1997, 
representing the highest share attained in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 19). Most ofthe 
increase in the value of M&A was due to large-scale cross-border M&A deals. These 
mega deals (worth more than$ 1 billion each) accounted for about a half of global M&A 
transactions values in 1997, compared to one quarter in 1995 (ibid. p. 20). Within the 
developed countries, which account for about 90 per cent of cross-border majority 
purchases, U.S. firms continue to account for the single largest share of the mega deals. 
The large-scale M&A are concentrated in the banking and insurance, chemical and 
8 Majority purchases are "transactions in which the foreign investor acquires more than half the voting 
securities of resulting business" (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 20). 
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pharmaceutical, and telecommunication and media industries (ibid. p. 20). These data 
show that a characteristic oftoday's world economy is not an increase in the overall stock 
of capital through the construction of new facilities (greenfield investment) but mainly an 
increased redistribution (via acquisitions and takeovers) and centralization (via mergers) 
of the previously existent world capital stock. 
3.2. Theoretical trends in FDI and the role of the NIE 
As the 1994 World Investment Report points out (UNCTAD, 1994), 
accommodating the steady growth of cross-border economic activity has produced 
considerable disagreement among economists, the debate being polarized mainly around 
two different theoretical schools. The first is the 'international trade school' based on 
neoclassical economics. The second is the 'industrial organization school', a less clearly 
unified paradigm. Michael Twomey (1993), Edward Graham and Paul Krugman (1993) 
and John Dunning (1995) acknowledged the influence ofRonald Coase's and 
Williamson's theoretical insights on the formation of the industrial organization school. 
The international trade school explains the dynamics of international trade and 
investment by focusing on countries' different endowments of factors of production. 
International investment reflects the movement of internationally mobile capital from the 
abundant to the scarce country, attracted by higher profit rates in the receiving country. In 
this account, both trade and international investment are simply aspects of perfect 
competition among atomistic firms, all enjoying equal access to technology and markets, 
with none large enough to influence prices of inputs or outputs. By assuming a world of 
complete markets and perfect competition (the key assumptions ofNEO), this approach 
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explores the benefits of global economic integration in the absence of TNCs and FDI, 
where the choice between flows of factors and flows of goods is essentially arbitrary 
(UNCTAD, 1994). 
As the industrial organization theorists pointed out, "the standard neoclassical 
theory has little to say about the very large firms that carry out much of the world's 
production and even more of the world's trade, nor about the ongoing process of entry 
and exit that characterizes most international markets"(McCulloch, 1993, p. 39). It cannot 
explain the emergence and purpose ofTNCs, or the increasing role ofFDI in the world 
economy as presented above. In an attempt to answer these questions, the international 
organization theorists 
have assumed a world where firms must constantly choose between trade and FDI in 
their drive to expand activities across borders, and ... [economic integration] ... reflects 
the strategic decision of firms to a world of cross-border market failures with significant 
transaction costs, in which the control over assets located in different countries certainly 
matters (UNCTAD, 1994, p. 119). 
The main ideas behind this logic were initially advanced by scholars from the 
field oflaw and economics (Coase, 1937) and the field of industrial organization 
(Williamson, 1975) in their concern with creating a theory of the firm and of contract. 
They criticized some neoclassical assumptions, particularly the assumptions of perfect 
market and perfect competition, arguing that there are significant transaction costs, like 
measurement, enforcement, or management costs, underlying any exchange. The birth 
and growth of the firm, and through extrapolation, the growing importance ofTNCs, is to 
be explained as an efficient solution engineered by economic entrepreneurs to deal with 
uncertainty and market imperfections and to minimize the transaction costs. In this sense, 
FDI represents an alternative mode of organizing exchange employed by TNCs in an 
effort to internalize certain transactions from the realm of the market within firms for 
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transaction minimization efficiency purposes. In the last two decades, there was an 
explosion of theories derived from the logic presented above. What came to be known as 
the "New Institutional Economics" represents the embodiment of these particular insights 
in the field of economics. 
3.3. Origins and development of the NIE 
It is commonly said that NIE began with Coase's seminal article on "The Nature 
ofthe Firm" (1937), with its explicit introduction oftransaction costs into economic 
analysis (Coase, 1998). A significant puzzle for mainstream economic orthodoxy was 
how to explain the existence of firms or other institutions in the economy. More 
generally, neoclassical economics failed to explain efficient or inefficient collective 
outcomes in terms of choices made by rational individuals. Coase (1937) attempted to 
solve this puzzle. His main argument was that there are costs underlying any transaction9 
and that firms, contracts, property rights and other institutions emerged as social devices 
to economize on these transaction costs. Williamson (1973, 1983, 1987, 1993, 1996) 
continued the implementation of this theoretical program at the micro-level of firms, 
contracts and organizations. He attempted to construct a theory of the firm and explain 
the diversity of different modes of economic organization. North (1981, 1989, 1990a, 
1990b, 1995) extended the logic of transaction cost economics at the macro-level of 
nation state, constitutions, cultural and ideological norms. He attempted to construct a 
theory of institutional development and to explain the diversity in the economic 
performance registered across time and space. 
9 As opposed to neoclassical economics that assumed zero transaction costs. 
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The phrase "the new institutional economics" was coined by Williamson with the 
intention of differentiating the subject from the "old institutional economics" (hereafter, 
OlE) as developed in the work of John R. Commons, Wesley Mitchell, and those 
associated with them (Coase, 1998). Exactly what kind of theory NIE is proposing and 
how different this is in respect to the main theoretical schools it draws upon (NEO and 
OlE) is subject to debate. 
NIE gives credit to OlE for its focus on the importance of institutions and 
institutional change in economic development and on transactions as the basic unit of 
analysis. Williamson (1996) finds particular affinities between his work and the work of 
John R. Commons. Other scholars (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1996; Groenewegen, et al., 
1995) also consider that striking parallels may be drawn between North's later works and 
that of John Commons. 
However, both the NIE and its critics- mostly from the OlE school - were 
concerned with clearly delimiting NIE from OlE. For the NIE critics, this body of 
knowledge differs from OlE in regard to both the epistemology (Ramstad, 1996; Dugger 
1990, 1996) and methodology (Dugger, 1990; Rutherford, 1995; Collard, 1995; Pratten, 
1997) applied when analyzing institutions. For the NIE school, "the OlE may be 
presented as descriptive, holistic and behaviorist and the NIE as formalist and 
reductionist. In ideological terms, the former can be depicted as collectivist and lacking 
technical rigour, the latter as anti-interventionist and excessively devoted to highly 
mathematical rational choice modelling" (Harris, Hunter and Lewis, 1996, p. 4)10. 
Within economics, NIE is broadly conceived as being consistent with, and 
supportive of, the orthodox mainstream perspective that is neoclassical economics. NIE 
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shares with NEO the basis of the choice-theoretic approach that underlies 
microeconomics and hence the neoclassical axioms of methodological individualism. 
One can conclude then, that what links NIE and NEO is a shared essential method 
(Pratten, 1997). However, as it will be shown in chapter three, the claims of major 
modifications to the neoclassical paradigm require further investigation. 
4. The need for global rules on foreign investment: Echoing an NIE perspective? 
In this empirical and theoretical setting, a predominant consensus between the 
representatives of international business, government officials in the developed world, 
academics and international development organizations emerged. 
There is now a predominant opinion that we are experiencing a new stage of 
global economic integration that affects the characteristics of the world economy and its 
underlying governance structure. There are claims that FDI has become the most 
important channeVinstrument of growth and the TNCs have become the major agents for 
delivering growth (UNCTAD, 1994, 1995, 1996). There are claims that these 
developments are underlying the formation of an integrated global economy in which 
nation states are forced to reconsider their role in the process of development (World 
Bank, 1997). Nation states, particularly the developing countries, should recognize the 
importance and role ofFDI in the development process by providing the needed legal 
transparency, predictability, and legal security required by foreign investors for investing 
in their economies. 
The dramatic proliferation of various international agreements on FDI during the 
1990s was a positive sign in this direction. At the bilateral level, the total number of 
1° For a detailed description of each of these differences between OlE and NIE see Rutherford (1994). 
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs) was 1,513 by the end of the 1997, of which about 
three-quarters were signed during the 1990s (UNCTAD, 1998, p. xix). At the regional 
level, prior to 1995, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
Canada, United States and Mexico provided the most important framework dealing with 
FDI issues. 
It was argued that there are several problems with the existing bilateral or regional 
agreements. Bilateral agreements appear to play a relatively insignificant role in 
attracting FDI for individual countries. Moreover, with their rapid proliferation since 
1990, they seem to have lost the capacity of signaling credible commitments for foreign 
investors (UNCT AD, 1998). Regional agreements usually focus on trade liberalization 
provisions and deal only additionally with FDI issues. They contribute - by increasing 
the market access of foreign investments - but do not address directly the policy 
framework for the treatment of foreign investment. They lack explicit provisions on the 
movement of factors of production, particularly FDI capital, and do not signal credible 
commitments for foreign investors due to loose dispute settlement and enforcement 
procedures (ibid.). 
In summary, the lack of policy coherence and the presence of multiple agreements 
might increase the uncertainty, confusion, and hence the costs of doing business 
internationally (WTO, 1996). The "business transaction costs [ ... ] arise directly from 
inadequacies of information, asymmetries in doing business in different countries, the 
heterogeneity of administrative procedures, and differences in business support 
measures" (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 123). Also, the fact that national laws and their 
enforcement may differ between the host and home country requires an internationally 
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efficient mechanism for dispute settlement. The argument seems particularly relevant in 
the case of developing and transitional countries. In these countries the content and the 
enforcement mechanism of domestic legislation concerning FDI is considered to be no 
alternative to internationally binding standards. Hence, the need for a binding multilateral 
agreement on FDI that would increase the credibility of government commitments by 
preventing backsliding as well as containing mechanisms for continuous liberalization 
and market oriented reforms (WTO, 1996; UNCTAD, 1998). 
These efficiency arguments with a clear NIE flavor are in line with the need for 
supranational institutions like the General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and 
its main successor the World Trade Organization (WTO) that for the last 50 years have 
been laboring to code an international legal framework for trade. The increasing role of 
FDI which started surpassing trade, calls for a multilateral framework governing 
investment as a fundamental piece in coding the constitution of the global economy based 
on similar efficiency arguments (Ruggerrio, 1998). 
The beginning of negotiations in June 1995 for a multilateral agreement on 
investment by the twenty-five (now twenty-nine) member states of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) confirmed that "their governments 
were not satisfied with the state of international law regarding foreign direct investment" 
and that "the time has come to negotiate a more comprehensive regime to govern foreign 
direct investment" (Hart, 1996, p. 4). The intention ofthe MAl negotiations was to 
establish a broad-based, comprehensive agreement that would serve as a benchmark for 
any further agreements on FDI. As Hoekman (1996) explained, the efficiency 
arguments reviewed above did not explain why negotiations began at the OECD and not 
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at the WTO. If the MAl was supposed to represent a global framework for governing 
foreign investment, the exclusion of developing countries from the agreement by 
conducting negotiations at OECD was not justified. 
The United States was at the forefront for starting negotiations at the OECD as 
opposed to negotiations at the WTO or at the United Nations Center for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and justified this choice for two reasons. First, the OECD was 
considered a better intermediate venue because of fears that the developing country 
members ofWTO or UNCTAD would impede the speed and content of negotiations for 
such a far reaching agreement (Hart, 1996). As Ambassador Eizenstat (1996), Under 
Secretary for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce explained, it was 
important to 
keep in mind that there are a number of developing countries that are adamantly opposed 
to initiating any WTO work on investment (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and India), and most of 
the developing countries that indicated support for WTO investment work want the mandate 
to remain educative in nature. [As a result] negotiations in other fora such as the WTO or 
UNCTAD would lead not only to substandard agreements but might also have the effect of 
taking momentum from negotiations in the OECD (Eizenstat, 1996, p. 19). 
The creation of a global treaty on investment was supposed to be a two-stage process 
with the MAl being the intermediate phase. As Donnelly (1996), Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Trade Policy and Programs, U.S. Department of State explained when 
stating the U.S. position on the MAl negotiations: 
The Clinton Administration attaches top priority to America's economic 
security as a goal of our foreign policy. NAFTA, the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT, APEC and the Summit of Americas, to name a few of the 
economic achievements of the last three years, have made the United States 
an integral part of an increasingly open global trading system .. . With completion 
of the Uruguay Round negotiation of the GATT, our attention has turned to 
the need to develop comprehensive international rules governing investment. .. 
. . . We believe the more sensible course is to complete negotiations of the MAl 
in the OECD, where we can be better assured of obtaining a high-standard 
agreement and allow it to serve as a benchmark for later negotiations in the 
WTO when there is greater acceptance of the need for such an agreement 
(Donnelly, 1996, p. 30) . 
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The second reason was that there were still disagreements between the U.S. and the other 
OECD member states on the exact disciplines and coverage of a general agreement on 
investment. As Donnelly explained again: 
. .. The United States has stated consistently that only a state-of-art agreement 
in the OECD, meeting or exceeding the standards of our Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), would be of interest to [the US] . This can be achieved by eliminating 
foreign government screening of inward investment in those few OECD countries 
where it still exists; providing national treatment for foreign investors when 
countries privatize state enterprises and open monopolized sectors of their 
economy to competition; and opening protected sectors to foreign investment. 
[The US does] not believe it is appropriate to a high-standard, multilateral investment 
agreement to carve out from its coverage either broad sectors of the economy, 
such as culture, or broad exceptions to the most favored nation commitments, 
such as for regional economic integration organizations. (Donnelly, 1996, p. 31) 
After three years of deliberations the negotiations on the MAl collapsed. As the 
U.S. representatives feared, the OECD governments proposed a large number of 
exceptions from the general rules including restrictions on foreign investment in the 
agriculture sector (European Union), the provision of subsidies and the carving out of the 
culture sector (France and Canada). In addition to disagreements among governments, the 
MAl found strong opposition from non-governmental organizations, in particular 
environmental and labor groups. Despite these difficulties there remains considerable 
support for global rules on foreign investment. FDI provisions resembling many of the 
MAl commitments 11 continued to be negotiated in different regional or multilateral fora. 
The most important regional attempts after 1995 are: the negotiations for an investment 
chapter ofthe Free Trade Agreement ofthe Americas (FTAA) started in June 1998 and 
expected to be concluded by 2005, the Trade and Investment Cooperation Arrangement 
11 The 1998 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 1998) reviews the main regional and multilateral FDI 
related agreements and their relation to past, and possible future work on an extensive MAl type 
multilateral framework for investment. See particularly pp. 59-74 and pp. 117-133 . 
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signed between MERCOSUR and Canada on 17 June 1998, the work on an ASEAN 
Investment Area framework agreement started in 1995, and the Energy Charter Treaty 
entered into force on 16 April1998 and ratified by 38 countries by the end of June 1998 
together with its Supplementary Treaty regarding investment. The most important 
multilateral attempts are: the FDI related agreements for the telecommunication service 
industries (the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
on Basic Telecommunication Services) and for the financial service sectors (the Fifth 
Protocol to the GATS on Financial Services) concluded at WTO in 1997. 
Further proposals have been considered by some countries to incorporate certain 
aspects of the MAl negotiations into the negotiating round expected to begin with the 
November 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting12• At the OECD Ministerial Council meeting 
in 1998, the Ministers ofMember countries stated that "they support the current work 
program on investment in the WTO and once the work program has been completed will 
seek the support of all their partners for next steps towards creation of investment rules in 
the WTO" (OECD, 1999, p. 1). The OECD work program relating to international 
investment will continue under the Committee on International Investment and 
Multilateral Enterprises in cooperation with other OECD committees, the WTO, 
UNCTAD, World Bank and the IMF in dialogue with developing countries, and 
representatives of civil society (ibid.). 
12 Switzerland, the European Communities, Japan, China and Korea have submitted communication 
documents regarding negotiations on trade and investment to the General Council of WTO in preparation 
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference (WTO, http://www.wto.org). In the case of China, Korea and the 
European Communities there is a clear recognition of the need to differentiate between FDI and other 
short-term capital of portfolio investment (MAl has lumped these elements together) and focus exclusively 
on the FDI negotiations. There is also a clear recognition of the importance oflabor and environmental 
related issues for any FDI negotiations. In the case of Japan (http://www.rniti.go.jp/report-
e/giT1102e.html), the proposal for WTO negotiations ofFDI resembles almost entirely the last MAl draft. 
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"The collapse of negotiations on a multilateral investment agreement in 1998 
suggests that a global treaty on investment rules is still some way off' (World Bank, 
1999, p. 82). However, "international mobile capital is here to stay" (ibid, p. 85). These 
institutional legal developments together with the theoretical developments ofNIE 
underlines the scope and importance of this study. 
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Chapter two: The MAl: content and analysis 
1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview and analysis of the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAl) draft. For the purpose of this thesis, the contents of the last MAl text, as of24 
April 1998, can be grouped under four main parts: preamble, scope, obligations and dispute 
settlement provisions. Sections 2 to 5 below present the summary and analysis of these four main 
components of the agreement. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main debates on the 
possible implications of the MAl and by explaining the need for a theoretical analysis of the 
logic behind the agreement. 
2. Preamble 
The preamble to the MAl encompasses four statements: (1) the circumstances shaping the 
context of, and the need for, the MAl; (2) the scope of the MAl; (3) the relation of MAl to 
international standards for environmental law and labor practices; and (4) the nature of the MAl 
as a free-standing agreement. The circumstances shaping the context of and the need for MAl 
include the belief of the contracting parties that international investment assumes a great 
importance in the world economy and the belief that the MAl will enhance the efficient 
utilization of economic resources, the creation of employment opportunities and the 
improvement of living standards. The scope ofthe MAl is the establishment ofmultilateral rules 
for foreign investment with high standards for the liberalization of investment regimes and 
investment protection and with effective dispute settlement that would complement and benefit 
the world trading system. The third statement expresses contracting parties' desire to implement 
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this agreement in a manner consistent with sustainable development and international 
environmental law (as reflected in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 
Agenda 21). It also recognizes their commitment to core labor standards1 by referring to the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises- whose non-binding legal nature is expressly 
highlighted. The fourth statement represents a declaration on the nature of MAl as a free-
standing agreement open to accession by all countries. 
The preamble to the MAl text reflects the assumption that economic development will 
arise as a positive externality from the implementation of the agreement. This condition, 
however, is neither a binding interpretation of the agreement nor a directly specified objective of 
the MAl itself. As a result, the MAl provisions would prevail, even in the cases when they would 
be inconsistent with effective developmental policies followed by a signatory country 
(Fitzgerald, Cubero-Brealey & Lehmann, 1998). For the MAl proponents, the international 
environmental standards reflected in the Rio Declaration represent the standards which the MAl 
will meet upon implemention (ibid.). For the MAl opponents (Sforza & Vallianatos, 1997; 
Clarke and Barlow, 1997; Swenarchuk, 1998), the MAl's provisions are in conflict with the 
provisions of the Rio Declaration and hence might represent a niche for escaping previous 
international environmental commitments. This position was also expressed in a joint "NGO 
Statement On The MAI"2 which was a result of the October 1997 NGOs/OECD consultations 
and endorsed by 565 organizations in 68 countries. The labor standards provided by the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are non-binding. The Trade Union Advisory Committee 
1 Noting that the International Labor Organization is the competent body to create and oversee these standards. 
2 Text available in Jackson and Sanger, 1998, p. 319. 
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of the OECD3 (TUAC, 1997) does not anticipate the voluntary compliance of corporations with 
the OECD Guidelines and argues for the necessity of introducing direct references to binding 
labor standards in the MAl text. Over the years, TUAC criticized the lack of attention paid by 
both TNCs and governments to the implementation of the OECD Guidelines (Jones, 1998). The 
OECD's monitoring of the impact of these guidelines on TNCs' activities in developing 
countries was particularly low (OECD, 1996). 
3.Scope 
The agreement's scope and application section establishes how broadly or narrowly the 
agreement is to be interpreted. In this section two key terms, "investor" and "investment", are 
defined. The MAl defines an investor as either a natural person (whether a national or a 
permanent resident) or an enterprise. An enterprise is defined as a "legal person or any other 
entity organized under the applicable law of the contracting party, whether or not for profit, and 
whether or not government owned or controlled" (OECD, 1998a, p. 11). The MAl is built upon a 
broad, asset-based definition of 'investment', which includes not only foreign direct investment 
as such but also the direct or indirect ownership or control of any other asset. The agreed 
approach in the last MAl draft is to provide broad coverage of all forms of investment coming 
from the MAl investors (Witherell, 1997). Non-traditional forms of foreign investment such as 
indirect investment, intellectual property, public debt, real estate, financial services, and short-
term investments are included in the definition of investment under the MAl. 
3 TUAC has consultative status with the OECD and, based on 1998 data (Jones, 1998) represents 70 million workers 
in 55 affiliated trade union national centers in the 29 OECD countries. 
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Notwithstanding the introduction of prudential measures and temporary derogation 
provisions with respect to financial capital flows4 under the last MAl draft, most foreign 
investment transactions are considered to be legitimate investments. The implications of this 
broad definition of investment which includes short-term investments are important in that short-
term capital flows are more likely to cause macroeconomic imbalances, particularly currency 
crises and have been traditionally given different, more restrictive treatment. It has been argued 
that MAl provisions will apply to all speculative investments including those types that have 
caused currency chaos in the Asian countries (Dobbin, 1998). It could also apply to the 
repatriation of assets and profits by foreign investors. Sudden capital outflows of these types, 
unrestricted by government controls were considered by some to be the main destabilizing factor 
that contributed to the Mexican peso crash in late 1994 (V allianatos, 1997). Because of the broad 
definition of investment which encompasses any kind of asset owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by an investor, it has been argued that any government or private action that affects 
any of the assets could be challenged under the MAl (Durbin, 1997). 
The MAl aims to apply to all economic sectors. As the critics remarked, "the MAl takes 
a top down rather than a bottom up approach to liberalization. In other words, a sector is covered 
by the Agreement unless it is specifically excluded" (Chapman, 1997, p. 12). The MAl also 
intends to apply to all levels of government. In the Canadian context, this raised concerns about 
the decline in the sovereignty and in the bargaining power of provincial governments in favor of 
federal governments and transnational corporations. The ability of minority and native groups to 
rely on self-governance and control of local development could also be decreased (Mercredi, 
1998). Acceptance of this provision of the MAl would also lead to de jure or de facto 
4 See the fmancial servicees obligation under Section 4 of this chapter. 
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amendments of existing national constitutions, for example in Canada, where such a transfer of 
power from provincial to federal government is argued to be unconstitutional (Robinson, 1998). 
4. Obligations 
Contracting Parties' obligations regarding the treatment of foreign investors are reflected 
in the MAl text under two types of standards. "Relative standards" of treatment - such as non-
discrimination - are standards for the treatment of foreign investors that refer to other already 
existing bodies of rules in the recipient country. As opposed to these, there are "absolute 
standards" of treatment - such as general treatment - that are not contingent on host countries' 
legislation but on international law (OECD, 1998b, p.29). The principle of non-discrimination is 
established by means of the relative standards of national treatment (NT) and most favored 
nation treatment (MFN). This provides that Contracting Parties shall accord to foreign investors 
and investments treatment no less favorable than that accorded to its own national investors and 
investments (NT) or to investments from any other country, whether or not party to the MAl 
(MFN); and in any case, shall accord to them the more favorable of NT and MFN, "with respect 
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, and sale or other disposition of investments" (OECD, 1998a, p. 13). Discrimination 
in the agreement includes both "de jure" (formally discriminatory) and "de facto" (discriminatory 
in effect) discrimination (OECD, 1998a, p.28). The General Treatment principle states that each 
Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another Contracting 
Party "fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security" (OECD, 1998a, 
p. 57), and in no case less favorable than that required by international law. 
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Under the MAl's National reservation provision contracting parties are allowed to lodge 
reservations to the NT and MFN principles by listing all the non-conforming measures 
maintained at the time of signing or acceding to the MAL The schedule is supposed to list all the 
non-conforming measures which the country intends to maintain, as well as future amendments 
to them with the obligation that the amendments would not increase the non-conformity of the 
measures (OECD, 1998a). The content of Annex A of the Agreement resembles the standstill 
principle of the MAl (the prohibition of newer or more restrictive exceptions) as explicitly 
mentioned in the Commentary text to the MAl draft. The 24 April 1998 MAl draft, differs from 
the May 1997 MAl draft in that the roll-back principle of the MAl (the liberalization process by 
which the reduction and eventual elimination of non-conforming measures will take place) 
appears in the agreement as a voluntary commitment and not as an explicit obligation. However, 
nothing else besides this and the shift of the explanatory provisions on the roll-back principle 
from the MAl text to the Commentary text section has been changed. The roll-back principle is 
still acknowledged as a fundamental principle of the MAl negotiations that would be effective on 
the Contracting Parties through strong peer pressure and/or exchange of concessions in 
subsequent rounds of negotiations5. 
The national reservations provision allows contracting parties to maintain some 
protectionist leverage in key sectors of the economy like culture, education, health and social 
services. However, consistency with the principles of standstill and roll-back requires the 
intention for future opening up of these sectors to foreign investment. France's attempts at the 
end of 1998, to obtain a definite exemption of its cultural sector met with strong opposition from 
the U.S. delegation and led to the withdrawal ofFrance from the MAl negotiations. The 
obligation to accord to foreign investors treatment no less favorable than for domestic firms 
5 See for example page 60 in OECD, 1998b. 
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eliminates governments options of screening foreign investment applications against certain 
criteria in line with national goals and objectives. Notwithstanding the provision of the national 
reservations' option, the standstill and roll-back principles underline the central commitment of 
the Agreement to identify and eliminate over time all sectoral or regional protections that 
contravene the principle of non-discrimination (NT and MFN). Further, as many critics have 
pointed out, the Agreement provides for non-discrimination of foreign investors in respect to 
domestic ones but does not prohibit a better treatment of the former than the latter (Khor, 1998; 
Dobbin, 1998; Durbin, 1997; FitzGerald, et al., 1998). This provides further incentives for 
governments to decrease the protection of the domestic industry by shifting performance 
requirements from the foreign to the domestic investors' responsibility. The inclusion of de facto 
discrimination under the MAl jurisdiction means that "if it can be proved that a measure has the 
effect of harming a foreign investment even if that harm was incidental or unintended, it could be 
challenged" (Dobbin, 1998, p. 19). 
The specific obligation provisions provided by the treaty include: transparency on 
administrative and judicial government rulings and regulations; granting of temporary entry and 
work permits to foreign investors, employees and their families; restrictions on the imposition of 
performance requirements; the obligation to treat foreign investors in a non-discriminatory way 
in respect to privatization, monopolies, concessions and investment incentives; as well as 
specific financial services provisions, expropriation and compensation provisions and withdrawal 
provisions. The most important specific obligation provisions are analyzed below. 
Performance requirements - The type of performance requirements that Contracting 
Parties are prohibited to impose, enforce, or maintain as a condition for the establishment, 
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acquisition, expansion or disposition of an investment, were effectively summarized by Anthony 
Chapman as follows: 
a) to export a certain level of goods; b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic 
content; c) to favor the purchase of domestically produced goods; d) to relate the amount 
of imports to the amount of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange from an investment; 
e) to restrict the domestic sale of goods or services by foreign enterprises to the level of exports 
or foreign exchange; f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary 
knowledge except when imposed as part of a ruling respecting national competition laws or to 
transfer intellectual property rights; g) to locate a headquarters in the Contracting Party; h) to 
provide an exclusive product mandate for the world or for a certain region; i) to achieve a certain 
level of investment, production, sales, employment, research or development in a Contracting 
Party; j) to hire a given level of local personnel; k) to establish a joint venture; or 1) to achieve 
a minimum level of local equity participation (Chapman, 1997, pp. 28-29) 6• 
The MAI' s provisions regarding the treatment of performance requirements represent 
some of the most controversial provisions in the MAI debates. Performance requirements are 
policy tools extensively applied by governments, particularly in developing countries, to use 
foreign investment to harness the development of local communities in which these corporations 
invest, or to fulfill overall sectoral or macroeconomic strategic development objectives. The MAI 
prohibits the imposition or enforcement upon a foreign investor of any type of conditionality on 
the source and use of its factors of production or on the management of its production, sales, 
profits, research and reinvestments which are not also required of domestic firms. Requirements 
to use local suppliers or to hire a minimum number of local employees as well as requirements 
for a specific location of headquarters, transfer of technology, ratio of exports to total sales, 
research and development or reinvestment within the area or host country, are the most relevant 
conditionalities now forbidden under the MAL The ban on performance requirements listed from 
f) through 1) would not apply with respect to the "receipt of an advantage" (OECD, 1998a, p. 22) 
6 The requirements listed from a) through e) can be applied with respect to: export promotion policies (for example, 
export processing zones), foreign aid programs, the production, processing and trade of agricultural products, 
advantages related to trade in services, custom duties or exceptions from such duties and preferential tariffs or 
quotas. 
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which is investment incentives granted by the receiving country. This provision might coerce 
governments to offer incentives in the forms of preferential taxes, subsidies or access to 
resources, including better treatment than offered to domestic firms, in order to obtain certain 
performance requirements from foreign investors. 
Privatisation - Under this provision contracting parties are obligated to accord NT and 
MFN in relation to all kinds of privatisation, irrespective of their method, or rules regarding 
subsequent disposal of a privatised assee. The privatization provision could affect particularly 
developing countries and those in transition from centrally planned to a market economy which 
are still involved in massive privatization programs. It could also affect developed and 
developing countries that intend to privatize infrastructure services in areas like transportation, 
telecommunication, banking and insurance, health or education. 
Monopolies, state enterprises and concessions8 - This provision refers to Contracting 
Parties' obligation to act in a non-discriminatory manner (to accord to foreign investors the best 
treatment ofNT and MFN) when creating, maintaining or eliminating monopolies, either state or 
privately owned, as well as state enterprises. The same principle extends over the granting of 
concessions, authorizations for the exploration and production of minerals and over transparency 
measures (the notification on the creation or elimination of monopoly). 
The prohibition of Contracting Parties to impose minimum or maximum levels of equity 
participation, as well as the provisions regarding privatization, the treatment of monopolies and 
7 The compatibility of different methods ofprivatisation with the NT and MFN is not clearly determined in the last 
MAl draft. The text includes alternative proposals from different delegations regarding this issue. However, a 
compromise seems to have been reached which declares special share arrangements contrary to the obligations of 
Nl and MFN if they discriminate de jure or de facto against foreign investors (see OECD, 1998a, pp. 27-30, 
specially footnote to paragraph 1, p. 28). 
8 The flexibility to lodge reservations to the agreement after the entry into force of the MAl, regarding this issue is 
not explicitly granted in the text. 
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the offering of government concessions represent limitations on government policies to protect 
specific sectors of the economy from foreign competition or ownership takeover. Governments, 
particularly in developing countries, maintain state or privately owned monopolies in key sectors 
of the economy like culture, education, health and social services and national defense. The MAI 
draft excludes from the areas subjected to the principles of the agreement just the defense sector. 
These arguments are particularly relevant in the light of current trends ofFDI (see chapter one, p. 
11) which show that the vast majority ofFDI represents majority purchases cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions mega-deals. 
Incentives- Any investment incentive measure is subject to the principle of non-
discrimination. The compatibility of performance requirements related incentives with the NT 
and MFN is not explicitly determined9• The obligation to extend any government subsidy to 
foreign investors could enable foreign commercial providers to claim equal access to public 
subsidies for health and social services including the ones targeted towards specific organizations 
such as community-based non-profit agencies (Sanger, 1998). Although the MAl's proponents 
(FitzGerald, et al., 1998) disagree, the inclusion of preferential treatment and subsidies to 
domestic investors under the MAI treatment could decrease tremendously developing countries' 
latitude in drafting their own development strategy. The extension of government subsidies to 
foreign investors represents a costly, and in many cases unrealistic option, for countries that 
might have a lower annual national budget than the value of the annual sales of a major 
transnational corporation. Being unable to extend its subsidies to all investors, these governments 
might choose to cut or eliminate such subsidies. Together with the other pressures towards 
9 The proposed text calls for further negotiations after the signature of the agreement regarding additional MAl 
disciplines for avoiding and minimizing the distorting effects of investment incentives on the flow of capital and 
investment decisions. 
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liberalization resulting from the privatization and monopoly provisions, this might cause a 
further crowding out of domestic investment in favor of foreign producers. 
Financial services10 - Within the financial service provisions, the most important one is 
the recognition that financial services are subject to the MAl principles. The agreement allows 
for exceptions from the application of the MAl as "prudential measures" necessary for investor 
protection or ensuring the stability of the financial system as long as they do not constitute 
"means of avoiding the Contracting Party's commitments or obligations under the Agreement" 
(OECD, 1998a, p. 81). This means that any prudential measure undertaken by a host government 
for ensuring the stability of its domestic financial system can be subject to dispute settlement if 
considered inconsistent with the MAl provisions by a foreign investor. The Agreement also 
allows for "temporary derogations" from the NT article relating to cross-border capital 
transactions in the event of "serious balance-of-payments" or "serious difficulties for 
macroeconomic management, in particular monetary and exchange rate policies" (ibid., p. 79). 
These non-conforming measures, however, shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), shall be temporary and subject to review and approval 
every six months by the IMF and shall be eliminated as soon as conditions permit. It results from 
the text that the IMF would be the institutional body that would decide which of the temporary 
derogations are consistent or not with this article of the Agreement. Further, based on the "text 
proposed by the IMF and supported by most of the delegations" (ibid., p. 80, footnote 7), any 
such assessment by the IMF shall be accepted by the Dispute Settlement Panel (see Dispute 
Settlement section below). There are concerns about possible loss of state sovereignty in the 
10 The MAl contains specific fmancial service provisions covering: prudential measures, recognition arrangements, 
authorization procedures, transparency, information transfer and data processing, membership of self-regulatory 
bodies and associations, payment and clearing systems/lender of last resort, and dispute settlement. 
33 
conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy, IMF decisions having precedence over the 
Dispute Settlement Panel and over national governments' decisions on what constitutes 
appropriate monetary stabilization policies. These concerns are particularly relevant to the 
developing countries that suffer from chronic balance of payment problems and inflation, and 
where governments' control of volatile capital flows is a major policy tool in stabilization. 
The inclusion of significant capital account transactions - such as short-term capital flows - and 
of financial services under the definition of investment does not imply a direct obligation of 
parties to completely liberalize their capital accounts. These provisions do however, constrain 
governments' option to control capital account transactions by making any government policy in 
this area subject to the dispute settlement provision. Even in cases of monetary crises (like the 
ones recently experienced by the Asian countries) the IMF, as opposed to the national 
government, will decide which temporary measures of capital account control a country can use. 
As most developing countries experience currency instability they would be the most affected by 
these provisions. 
Expropriation and compensation - The MAl text bans any direct or indirect 
expropriation, nationalization and "any measures having equivalent effect"11 (OECD, 1998a, 
p.57) except if implemented in the public interest12, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance 
with the law and subject to prompt, fully convertible and transferable compensation at "fair 
market value" (ibid.). The host party for the investment has the obligation to pay interest rate 
payments or exchange loss adjustments when applicable. The expropriation and compensation 
provisions do not include a clear definition of expropriation. Similar to NAFTA's provisions, the 
11 A taxation measure, for example, is subject to the expropriation and dispute settlement provisions if it exceeds 
"the bounds of internationally recognized tax policies and practices" (OECD, 1998a, p. 87, footnote 3b). 
12 The proposed text provides signatories with a general exemption from the obligations under the expropriation and 
compensation articles for reasons of national security, public law and order, and maintenance of international peace. 
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text refers to direct expropriation, indirect expropriation and to measures having equivalent 
effect. Therefore, expropriation can be by default defined by legal precedents in international or 
U.S. disputes, particularly the ones arising out ofNAFTA (Dobbin, 1998). The best assessment 
of the possible effects of these provisions can be determined by looking at the use of similar 
provisions under NAFTA. Of the seven known challenges using NAFTA's investor right-to-sue-
governments provisions, six involve U.S. corporations sueing federal or state-level 
environmental measures in Canada and Mexico (Global Trade Watch, 1998). The most cited 
example by the MAI critics is the 1998 case Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of Canada. The 
Canadian Parliament acted to ban the import and interprovincial transport of an Ethyl product -
the gasoline additive MMT - when public health officials determined that it my be a dangerous 
toxin. The U.S. based Ethyl Corporation responded by filing a lawsuit against the Canadian 
Government under NAFTA (Sforza & Vallianatos, 1997). The Ethyl Corporation demanded 
$251 million in compensation for expropriation of property, including expected future profits 
from sales, and further threatened to increase its demanded compensations for the Canadian 
government's damage to the company's reputation should further deliberations by the Canadian 
Parliament be undertaken. "Faced with the growing likelihood it could lose the suit, Canada 
agreed to repeal the ban and pay Ethyl $13 million in damages for lost profits to-date. Canada 
further agreed to pronounce MMT safe - without scientific evidence and in direct contradiction to 
the views ofthe nation's environmental protection agency" (Global Trade Watch, 1998, p. 1). 
This example shows that the expropriation and compensation provisions can seriously influence 
governments' capability to undertake environmental, health, or for that matter, any policy 
decision that can be challenged by a foreign investor under the MAI provisons. 
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Withdrawal - Finally, the MAl requires at least a five-year period before notice to 
withdraw from the agreement can be given, followed by the requirement to honor existing 
obligations to existing foreign investors and companies for another 15 years. "Effective locking-
in is thereby guaranteed" for 20 years after signing onto the MAl (FitzGerald, et al., 1998, p. 22). 
One can argue that this provision, together with the standstill and roll-back provisions, can 
restrict signatory countries to one particular model of development by binding several future 
governments or Parliaments to the core provisions of the MAL Together they provide for an 
effective mechanism for the continual liberalization of trade and investment and for the 
harmonization of national legislation with the more liberal ones. 
5. Dispute Settlement 
The MAl text provides two mechanisms for resolving disputes regarding an alleged 
breach of the Agreement: state-state arbitration and investor-state arbitration. The main 
elements of these two types of dispute settlement and the differences between them are presented 
below. 
State-state arbitration - This type of dispute settlement is a mechanism for Contracting 
Parties to address disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement. The 
mechanism includes several levels. First, the Parties must attempt to resolve the dispute through 
consultations, mediation or conciliation. If these consultations fail to reach an agreement the 
issue may be submitted to an arbitration tribunal. The tribunal would consist of either three or 
five members (if either Party chooses so). The tribunal members would be appointed by the 
Secretary General of the International Center for the Settlement of the Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) from within a roster maintained for this purpose. The tribunal might request reports on 
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any scientific or technical matter elaborated by a technical review board or an expert. Possible 
remedies that a tribunal could award are: a declaration that an action was in contravention of 
obligations under the Agreement; a recommendation that a Contracting Party should conform to 
these obligations; and an award of pecuniary compensation for any loss or damage to the 
requesting Party's investor. Tribunal awards will be made publicly available and will be final and 
binding but subject to partial or total nullification13 • If the tribunal nullifies the award, the dispute 
would be submitted to a new tribunal. There is no explicit mention in the MAl text how many 
times these processes can be repeated. If a Party fails to comply with the award, the Parties . 
group 14 may decide to what extent the requesting Party will be allowed to take responsive 
measures (such as suspension of the benefits to the non-complying Party or its investors). Each 
party is obligated to pay the cost of its representation, the cost of the tribunal being split between 
parties. All these rules and procedures apply unless the disputing Parties agree to apply others. 
Investor-state arbitration - This represents a mechanism under which the foreign investor 
(but not the host countries' government) may file claims concerning an alleged breach of the 
MAl, or of a specific obligation acquired by the Contracting Party under an authorization or 
written agreement. The foreign investor would have the option of having the dispute settled in 
one ofthe following venues: to the courts of the Contracting Party, in accordance with any 
agreed upon procedure or by arbitration15 • The arbitration tribunal will consist of three members 
and the arbitration award will be final and binding. The award may declare that the Contracting 
13 Either party can request the partial or total annulment of an award on the grounds that: the tribunal was not 
properly constituted, has manifestly exceeded its powers or was faced with corruption; there has been a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or the award has failed to state the reasons on which it was based. 
14 The Parties group comprise the Contracting Parties assisted by an elected Chair and by a Secretariat. Intergroup 
decisions should be made by consensus or majority. 
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Party contravened the Agreement and may request prompt pecuniary compensation or restitution 
in kind (when possible) of any loss or damage suffered by the investor. 
The concerns related to the dispute settlement provisions refer mostly to the investor-state 
provision. The Ethyl Corporation vs. Canadian Government case presented above is a direct 
application of the investor-state arbitration mechanism under the dispute settlement procedure as 
drafted in NAFT A and the MAl. This mechanism allows a foreign investor to take the 
government of the host country directly to court for an alleged breach of the MAl obligations. As 
the amount of pecuniary compensation for all perceived direct or indirect expropriation can be 
extremely high, a national government might be expected to constrain itself from any measure or 
legislation that might affect foreign investors' expected revenue flows, as in the Etyl corporation 
vs. Government of Canada case. In this sense, devising policies as well as covering 
compensations arising out of other direct or indirect interfering measures, could therefore 
become a costly policy option, particularly for developing countries. As Appleton put it: "if a 
government persists in its goal of implementing MAl-inconsistent actions, that government may 
be forced to rent backjurisdiction. Governments are able to function freely, but they may have to 
pay compensation to do what they were elected to do" (Appleton, 1998, pp. 185-186). 
6. Conclusions 
The MAl negotiating draft, as of24 April 1998, consolidated an important 3 years ' 
dynamic of the most powerful countries in the world towards a benchmark multilateral 
agreement on foreign investment. As the negotiations collapsed, this draft might never be applied 
15 The arbitration can be conducted under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States (ICSID), the ICSID Additional Facility, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
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in practice or it may differ from any text that is eventually settled upon. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of the Agreement undertaken in this chapter underlines the overview logic and the main 
themes of concern, should the. MAl or similar agreements materialize in the future. 
On one side, the MAl's proponents argue that MAl will enhance the efficient utilization 
of economic resources, the creation of employment opportunities and the improvement of living 
standards. In this sense, the MAl represented both a set of general playing rules for foreign 
investment transactions - designed to reduce the uncertainty of foreign investors regarding 
national governments' treatment of their investments- and an efficient mechanism of enforcing 
these rules- via lock-in, roll-back and effective dispute settlement procedures. In their opinion, 
the MAl would particularly help reforming developing countries that iack credible political 
commitments and secure systems of property rights and hence, FDI inflows. 
On the other side, the MAl's critics argue that the adoption of such an Agreement could 
have negative implications for governments' policies in the field of social services, health, 
culture, environmental policy, monetary and fiscal policy or, more generally, for any national 
development strategy. In this sense, the MAl would constrain governments - particularly 
developing countries' governments- from imposing obligations on TNCs to serve local 
economic, environmental or social needs related to their investments. Both proponents and critics 
of the MAl implicitly recognize that the Agreement would represent the benchmark for any 
further international agreements on foreign direct investment. The intention was to introduce the 
MAl under the auspices of the OECD and to proceed from there by peer group pressure for the 
attraction of the non-negotiating countries, particularly the developing ones to become signatory 
partners. From the beginning, the intention of the negotiators was to establish a broad-based 
agreement that would have as signatory members all the developing countries now members of 
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WTO. The OECD venue for the initial negotiations was considered a better intermediate venue 
for the conducting of negotiations than the WTO because of fears that the developing countries 
members of WTO would impede the speed and content of negotiations for such a far reaching 
agreement (Hart, 1996)16• Hence, there are concerns about the imbedded institutional constraint 
mechanism that resides behind the so-called free accession option of the developing countries. 
A closer look at the various opinions on the possible implications of the MAl reveals 
the polarization of the debate around two main clusters. First, there are general concerns about 
the possible loss of state sovereignty in favor of the modem (transnational) corporation (the 
state/firm debate). Second, there are specific concerns about developing countries' possible loss 
of sovereignty and political flexibility in drawing their own domestic developmental strategies 
(the 'state/state' debate). An analysis of the arguments ofboth sides of the debate points out the 
fact that the differences between the sides reside not so much in the different opinions on 
possible implications of the Agreement that they envision as in the questions that they address. 
The MAl critics are more concerned with the questions "will the MAl decrease the sovereignty 
of states in favor of the modem corporation?" and "is the MAl a lever for constraining 
developing countries in their integration into the global economy?" In contrast, MAl proponents 
are more concerned with the question "is the MAl an efficient solution to the development 
process ofboth developed and developing countries?" To better understand the sources of the 
disagreements between the critics and proponents of the MAl we need a closer look at the 
different main theories (NEO and NIE) that seek to explain the increasing importance of TNCs 
and FDI in today's world economy, as they have different implications for policy analysis and 
policy making in the fields of development and reform. 
16 See also the discussion in chapter one, pp. 19-22 
40 
Chapter three: The Williamson-North NIE Framework: content and analysis. 
1. Introduction 
The objective of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) is to create a theory of 
institutions and to incorporate it into neo-classical economics to permit the latter to "deal 
with an entire range of issues heretofore beyond its ken"(North, 1995, p.l7). Central 
questions in NIE are: what are 'institutions'? why have they come into existence? and 
what are their consequences for economic performance? 
Within NIE Oliver Williamson focuses on institutions like firms and contracts. 
Douglass North focuses on institutions like polities and property rights. When analyzing 
the dynamics of institutional development, however, they refer to both types of 
institutions. Sections 2 to 5 below look at the answers to the main NIE theoretical 
questions as resulting from the works of Williamson and North. Section 6 concludes by 
emphasizing the departure ofNIE from neoclassical economics (NEO) and the practical 
implications of this for economic development and reform. 
2. What are 'institutions'? 
The variable to be explained in NIE is the institution. Definitions of 'institution' 
refer to a framework of behavior: institutions direct, channel, or guide behavior 
(Groenewegen, et al. 1995). For North (1990a, 1995), institutions are the ' rules of the 
game' of a society or the 'institutional environment' for individual behavior. They are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure repeated human interaction, by structuring 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic (North, 
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1989,1990a). "They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, 
regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms ofbehavior and self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics ofboth" (North, 1995, p.23). 
North is concerned not just with the background rules of a society but also with 
the main governance structure that creates and enforces these rules. The governance 
structure behind the institutional environments is the state. In his later works, North 
(1981, 1989, 1990a, 1990b) and North and Weingast (1989) apply a NIE transaction cost 
theory of the state. The state is the 'third party enforcer' of contracts between agents 
developed to sustain complex transactions that appear as a result of increased 
specialization and division of labor. From an organizational point of view, the state is a 
set of institutions that facilitate political and economic transactions. Compared to other 
organizations in an economy, the state has a comparative advantage in violence and it 
trades protection and justice for revenue (North, 1989). Ideology plays an increasingly 
important role in North's (1981 on) explanations for the emergence and development of 
the state (see discussion of non-wealth maximizing motivations in section 3.1. below). 
When operationalized however, the state is more like a 'political firm': it is born for 
economic purposes - reducing uncertainty and transaction costs - and it runs on 
economic reasoning - trading protection and justice for revenue. This conceptualization 
of the state adopts Williamson's organizational perspective on institutions and downplays 
the political purposes that underpin the emergence of the state. 
For Williamson, institutions are the "institutional arrangements" defined as "the 
contractual relation or governance structure between economic entities that defines the 
way in which they cooperate and/or compete", or as the "institutional matrix, in which 
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the integrity of a transaction is decided" (Williamson, 1996, p. 378). Four discrete 
institutional arrangements are recognized: classical market, hybrid, hierarchy and public 
bureaus (Williamson, 1996). Williamson is directly concerned with the first three. 
Classical markets (hereafter, markets) refer to the neoclassical concept of perfect 
markets. Markets are characterized by "large numbers ofbuyers and sellers on each side 
of the transaction and [by the fact that the] identity [of the transactors] is not important, 
because each can go its own way at negligible cost to the other" (Williamson, 1996, p. 
378). Hybrids are "long-term contractual relations that preserve autonomy but provide 
added transaction-specific safeguards, compared with the market" (ibid.). Hierarchy is 
defined as "transactions that are placed under unified ownership (buyer and supplier are 
in the same enterprise) and subject to administrative controls (an authority relation, to 
include fiat)"(ibid.). 
In NIE each type of institution aligns with a specific legal or contractual structure 
that offers specific costs as well as specific incentives for the contracting parts. 1 Markets 
are supported by classical contract law. Hybrid and hierarchy are supported by non-
standard forms of contract, sometimes referred to as relational contracts (Furubotn & 
Richter, 1992). Classical contract law is comprehensive, it applies to the ideal transaction 
in neoclassical economics in which the identity of the parties is irrelevant, and supports 
the autonomous market form of organization (Williamson, 1996). Litigations resulting 
from this type of contract are resolved in court with strict reference to the law. 
Nonstandard forms of contract that underlie hybrids and hierarchy emerge as the 
1 As it will be shown in Section 5 of this chapter, the analysis of the different legal and contractual structure 
that underlies each type of institution is fundamental for the NIE logic. By looking at the relative costs with 
the design, enforcement, and adaptation of an institution as well as at the effect the institutions have on 
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characteristics of transactions diversify and the identity of the transactors matters. In 
contrast to classical contracts, relational contracts allow for gaps and flexibility in the 
drafting and revision of the agreement, accepting that "negotiations on matters of concern 
will be undertaken more or less continuously" (Furubotn & Richter, 1992, p. 20). The 
forum to which disputes are referred is that of arbitration (in case ofhybrids) or 
hierarchies (in case of hierarchical arrangements) rather than the courts. In the case of 
hierarchy "the parties must resolve their differences internally. Accordingly, hierarchy is 
its own court ofultimate appeal" (Williamson, 1996, p. 98). 
With reference to the state, constitutions, legislative enactments, regulations and 
executive decrees, are the legal devices that underlie political transactions. These 
"political institutions constitute ex ante agreements about co-operation among 
politicians" (North, 1990b, p. 359), are long term oriented, comprehensive and hence last 
on a flexibility scale of contractual forms. The system of property rights and the "credible 
commitments"2 are the most important type of contracts applied by the institutions of the 
state (ibid. p. 357). The court for settling disputes arising out of these agreements can be 
Parliament, Congress, the common law courts or society itself- in case of revolutions 
(North, 1989). 
economic performance via the incentive set that they provide for human behavior, NIE ranks one type of 
institution in respect to another. 
2 Credible commitment refers to "a contract in which a promisee is reliably compensated should the 
promisor prematurely terminate or otherwise alter the agreement" (Williamson; 1996, p.377). In case of 
political credible commitments, "one has assurances that political bodies will not violate contracts of 
parties or engage in conditions that will alter radically the wealth and income of parties" (North, 1990a, p. 
59). 
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3. Why do institutions come into existence? 
That the main purpose and effect of institutions is economizing on transaction 
costs and reducing uncertainties is a theme running through the works of Williamson 
(1983, 1987, 1996) and North (1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1996). By modifying NEO's basic 
set of initial assumptions on the behavioral characteristics of the individuals involved in 
transacting and on the characteristics of the markets in which they transact, NIE allows 
for the existence of uncertainty and hence, transaction costs. Uncertainty and transaction 
costs further explain the emergence of institutions. 
Neoclassical economic theory is built on the assumptions of scarcity and 
instrumental rationality. Scarcity implies competition. Instrumental rationality implies 
that rational behavior means acting in a way that is maximally efficient in achieving 
one's goals or system of goals (Audi, 1995). The efficiency argument in NEO assumes 
that the actors possess sufficient information to evaluate correctly the existing 
alternatives. It also assumes that they possess the sufficient computational power to 
process this information in order to make choices that will achieve the desired ends. 
Institutions are not present in the standard neoclassical equilibrium model. This model 
conceptualizes the 'market' as: 
an abstract realm of impersonal economic exchange of homogeneous goods 
by means of voluntary transactions on an equal basis between large numbers 
of autonomous, fully-informed entities with profit-maximizing behavioral 
motivations and able to enter and leave freely (Harriss-White, 1995, p. 87). 
Even if the rationality postulate allows for the existence of institutions, they play a purely 
passive role in the sense that they do not influence the choices the actors make. 
In the 'frictionless' neoclassical world described above, new institutional 
economists argue, "institutions are unnecessary; ideas and ideologies don't matter; and 
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efficient markets - both economic and political - characterise economies" (North, 1995, 
p.17). As a result, prices are a sufficient allocative device to achieve the highest value 
uses, problems of contract enforcement would largely disappear, and there would be no 
economic advantages to private property and markets over, say, collective planning 
(Furubotn & Richter, 1997). 
NIE retains the scarcity and hence competition assumption, but partially modifies 
the instrumental rationality postulate and some of the restrictive assumptions in the 
notion of 'the market' central to neoclassical economics. For Williamson the 'contracting 
person' is distinguished from the orthodox conception of maximizing rational person in 
two respects. First, behavior is "intendedly rational but only limitedly so" (Williamson 
1996, p. 3 77). This condition of "bounded rationality" refers to "limited cognitive 
competence to receive, store, retrieve, and process information". The second behavioral 
assumption is that of "opportunism" defined as "self-interest seeking with guile" (ibid. p. 
6). Opportunism describes economic agents' intention to "disclose information in a 
selective and distorted manner. Calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, obfuscate and 
confuse are thus admitted" (ibid. p. 56). 
Similarly, North explores two aspects of human behavior: (1) "motivation" and 
(2) "deciphering the environment" (1990a, p. 20). Motivation refers to opportunistic 
behavior of economic or political entrepreneurs - to conceal information, "cheat, steal, 
or lie when the payoff to such activity exceeds the value of alternative opportunities" 
(ibid. p. 30) and "if the institutional matrix rewards piracy (or more general redistributive 
activities) ... [to the opportunistic behavior] ofleaming to be better pirates" (North, 1995, 
p. 24). Deciphering the environment refers to "computational limitations of the individual 
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... determined by the capacity of mind to process, organize, and utilize information .. .in 
conjunction with the uncertainties involved in deciphering the environment" (North, 
1990a, p. 25). This is in fact the process ofleaming or acquiring knowledge from the use 
of information, a process that North claims depends fundamentally on the "subjective 
mental models" (ibid. p. 21) of individuals about the world around them. North 
recognizes that "self-imposed codes of conduct", "altruism" and "ideological 
convictions" are non-wealth maximizing motivations that play an important role in 
individuals' decision-making processes and that significantly determine the subjective 
mental models (ibid. p. 22). Nonetheless, as Rutherford (1995) observes, he adopts the 
neoclassical practice of assuming behavior is intentionally rational and hence retains its 
maximizing orientation. Ramstad (1996) makes a similar observation in the case of 
Williamson. 
NIE' s modifications in NEO's behavioral assumptions have important theoretical 
implications. Together with changes in NEO's assumptions about the characteristics of 
the market they allow for the introduction of transaction costs variables in the NEO 
model and hence, constitute the building blocks of the NIE theory of institutional 
development. 
With respect to the changes in the second set of assumptions (on the concept of 
'market') both authors employ stylized descriptions of the market. North criticizes NEO's 
assumption of the homogeneity of goods and services by pointing to the different 
attributes of the products exchanged, and to the different attributes of the performance of 
the agents involved in transactions. He gives examples like the purchase of an automobile 
or the purchase of a doctor's services. A particular color, style or gasoline mileage of the 
47 
car, in the first case, or the particular skills of the doctor and office waiting time, in the 
second case, are all different valued attributes by the buyer. "The value of an exchange to 
the parties, then, is the value of the different attributes lumped into the good or service" 
(North, 1990a, p. 29) which differs significantly from one case to another. 
Williamson criticizes NEO's description of the market by looking at the different 
attributes of the transactions as they appear in real markets: asset specificity, frequency 
and uncertainty. Asset specificity refers to "a specialized investment that cannot be 
redeployed to alternative uses or by alternative users except at a loss of productive value. 
Asset specificity can take several forms, of which human, physical, site, and dedicated 
assets are the most common" (Williamson, 1996, p. 377). The different frequency with 
which transactions recur is important for different reasons. Low frequency, like asset 
specificity, can lead to bilateral dependencl between exchanging parts, higher costs in 
finding the right terms of exchange and in higher uncertainty. For Williamson, 
transactions are also subject to different degrees and types of uncertainty, real markets 
being characterized by greater uncertainty in transactions than ideal classical markets. In 
NIE, real markets replace ideal homogeneous, frequent, between large numbers of agents, 
impersonal and secure transactions with asset specific, sporadic, personal, uncertain, and 
between small numbers of agents, bilaterally dependent and highly uncertain transactions. 
Once we adopt the contractual rational person versus the neoclassical rational 
person, the non-homogeneity of goods and services and the discrete characteristics of the 
transactions, it logically results that there is a cost of running the economic, social and 
political system. Finding out the information needed to transact, transforming it into 
3 Bilateral dependency refers to "an ongoing dependency relation . . . between a buyer and a supplier when 
one or both have made durable specialized investments in support of the other" (Williamson, 1996, p. 377). 
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knowledge, acting upon it and enforcing agreed upon individual or collective actions 
become costly in terms of money, capital, labor and time. NIE refers to these costs as 
transaction costs. 
For North, transaction costs are the "costs of measuring the valuable attributes of 
what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing 
agreements" (North, 1990a, p. 27). They "consist ofthe resource inputs of land, labor, 
and capital involved [ .. . ] in transacting - defining, protecting and enforcing the property 
rights to goods (the right to use, the right to derive income from the use of, the right to 
exclude, and the right to exchange)" (ibid., p. 28) where information costs are that part of 
transaction costs which includes "the costs of measuring the valued attributes of goods 
and services and the varying characteristics of the performance of the agents" (ibid., pp. 
30-31 ). North distinguishes between transaction costs that "go through the market" and 
therefore are measurable, and "hard-to-measure costs". The first category includes "the 
cost associated with banking, insurance, finance, wholesale, and retail trade; or, in terms 
of occupations, with lawyers, accountants, etc"(ibid., p. 28). The second category 
includes "unmeasured costs of societal cooperation" (North, 1989, p. 1320) like 
"queuing, waiting, rationing, bribery" (ibid., p. 1324) present particularly in developing 
countries. 
For Williamson transaction costs are "the costs of running the economic system" 
(1996, p. 379). Because in his analysis every transaction aligns- as a function of its 
characteristics- with discrete contractual forms, and simultaneously, with different 
governance structures, he refers interchangeably to the concepts of 'transaction cost', 
'cost of contracting', and 'cost of governance'. Williamson distinguishes between "the ex 
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ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement" and "the ex post costs 
of maladaptation and adjustment" (Williamson, 1987, pp. 81-82). Ex-ante costs refer to 
measurement and searching expenses to assure a closer correspondence between the 
value and price of the product exchanged or labor force employed. They also refer to 
expenses incurred in designing the most appropriate contract for safeguarding the values 
in exchange (ex ante incentive alignment). Ex-post costs "arise when contract execution 
is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances" 
(Williamson, 1996, p. 379). Hence, they underlie the effort to facilitate efficient 
adaptations of the ex ante agreements. The ex post costs "include the setup and running 
costs of the governance structure to which monitoring is assigned and to which disputes 
are referred and settled" (Williamson, 1987, p. 388). Critical examples of ex post 
adaptation costs are "sunk costs" and "bureaucratic costs" (Williamson, 1987, 1996). 
Sunk costs emerge as a result of asset specificity. Where transactions are sufficiently 
unique and/or infrequent that reputational constraints do not obtain and one party of the 
transaction can affect the value (costs and quality) of the product supplied, sunk costs 
must be incurred by one or both parties to the exchange to support the continuation of the 
contract. Bureaucratic costs refer to costs implied by bureaucracy - the support staff and 
administrative control required for providing direction to the operating parts of a 
hierarchical enterprise (Williamson, 1996). 
In conclusion, in NIE transactions costs can be thought of as embracing all those 
costs that are connected with: (i) the creation, enforcement and restructuring of an 
institutional environment or arrangement; and (ii) the use of an institutional environment 
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or arrangement (Furubotn & Richter, 1992)4. The observation that imperfect information 
and uncertainty make any transaction costly and that reality resembles a world 
characterized by positive transaction costs fundamentally changes NEO's idea of the real 
world. People are not perfect, their actions can have unexpected individual or unintended 
collective outcomes. Markets are not perfect; they might break down and not clear via 
price movements. Additional mechanisms for coordination, such as institutions, are 
needed to make transactions possible. In designing efficient economic reforms policy 
makers need to identify efficiency criteria to choose between different alternative 
institutions (institutional environments and arrangements). Determining such criteria calls 
for theoretical explanations of the interaction between institutions and economic 
performance. 
4. The consequence of different institutions for economic performance. 
Neoclassical economics defines economic performance as efficient - under 
conditions of zero transaction costs- ifbased on a profit-maximization rationale. At the 
micro level an efficient firm is maximizing profits and minimizing production costs. At 
the macro level an efficient economy, or nation state, is maximizing its gains from trade. 
Institutions are not influencing economic performance as Pareto optimal efficiency 
(maximizing the welfare of the society in the sense that no one will be able to be better 
4 Although Furubotn and Richter don't use directly the institutional environment- arrangement terminology 
in their classification of transaction costs, but rather talk about the creation, change, and use of "an 
institution or organization" (1992, p. 8), it is precisely the former distinction that they have in mind. The 
"creation, enforcement and . . . restructuring [of the] "rules of the game" ... represent activities that are 
associated with the first kind of transaction cost [the creation or change of an institution or 
organization] ... [The] "second type of transaction cost [the use of the institution or organization] ... are 
costs associated with the use of markets ... [and] ... the right to give orders within a firm" (ibid. pp. 8-9). 
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off without making someone worse off) arises from the atomistic interaction of self-
seeking individuals. 
NIE points out that although NEO implies the existence of institutions, it is not 
able to explain them. By introducing transaction costs, maximization becomes costly both 
in the production and in the management sense, and individual and groups' decision 
making suddenly takes place within a constantly uncertain and dynamic environment. 
Institutions become necessary to allow for rational maximization at minimum total costs 
(production and transaction costs). Institutions affect the performance of the economy by 
reducing the transaction costs and hence by increasing the maximum social output. 
But, as NIE explains, allocative efficiency (the best allocation of scarce resources at 
minimum cost) is only part of the story. Maximization takes place at both a certain 
moment in time and over different time periods. The initial concept of the allocative 
efficiency of resources applied by neoclassical economics is then enlarged in NIE to deal 
with situations of adaptation over time. "Adaptive efficiency" is concerned with the kinds 
of institutions that shape the way an economy evolves over time (North, 1990a, p. 80). 
The NIE's theoretical explanation of the interaction between institutions and 
economic performance rests on the idea that each institution offers different incentives 
that have different allocative and adaptive efficiencies. Through the incentive structure 
that it provides, the general institutional environment constrains the choice set of 
individual choices. Alternative institutional arrangements emerge to take advantage of 
opportunities embedded in the institutional environment. The historical development of 
the institutional arrangements is drastically constrained by the initial institutional 
framework. Efficient adaptations at the institutional environment level are slow and 
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incremental. The causality however runs both ways, with political and economic 
entrepreneurs devoting resources to alter a certain institutional environment when the 
expected benefits (in terms of minimizing transaction costs) exceed the cost of 
transformation (North, 1990a). Development arises from the interaction between these 
two institutional levels with technology and the entrepreneurial spirit being the major 
forces that determine change (North, 1990a; Williamson, 1996). 
5. Efficiency criteria for comparative institutional analysis 
The components of the institutional environment can either increase or decrease 
the society's total costs of exchange and production. The institutions of state, for 
example, can imply different levels of organizational costs. The U.S. Congress represents 
in North's opinion the closest proxy to the ideal model of polity being characterized by 
low cost transacting "as compared to a totalitarian polity"3 (North, 1990b, p. 360). But 
the most important component of the institutional environment in effecting development 
is an "efficient system" of property rights, that is, one that "maximizes social output" 
(North, 1981, p. 24) or reduces transactions costs and "encourages economic growth" 
(ibid, p. 25). In North's opinion, the institutional environment most favorable to affect 
efficient property rights is a modem democratic society with universal suffrage and 
flexible vote trading. Lack of economic growth in developing countries is attributed to 
"inefficient property rights" that arise out of the attempts of those who control the 
3 As both North and Williamson point out, as a comparative institutional matter, secure totalitarian regimes 
can, according to the transaction costs logic, be expected to design more efficient public agencies. 
However, if one takes in consideration the "unmeasured costs of societal cooperation" (North, 1989, p. 
1320) like "queuing, waiting, rationing, bribery" (ibid, p. 1324) or "if democratic values are held to be 
paramount. . . [ . . . ] ... the apparent inefficiencies of agencies under a democracy are simply a cost of this form 
of governance" (Williamson, 1996, p. 229). 
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apparatus of the state to generate rents together with problems of measurement and 
transaction costs (Rutherford, 1994, p.161 ). "Third World countries are poor because the 
institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to politicaVeconomic activity that do not 
encourage productive activity" (North, 1990a, p. 11 0). 
North's explanation for the contrast between the success story of the developed 
countries (principally the U.S.) with the failure of the developing countries is the 
prevalence of incentives for cost reducing institutional innovations in the one and their 
absence in the other. One may ask, however, why rational political and economic actors 
in developing countries do not replicate the efficient type of institutions of the developed 
ones? How can we explain a history of persistent underdevelopment of the developing 
countries? North (1990a) finds the explanation in the opportunistic behavior of the actors 
and their subjective perceptions about the true model of the world and about the fairness 
of the institutional environment. The subjective perceptions are reflected in self-enforced 
codes of conduct and in the ideologies embraced by economic and political actors. 
Together with the "cultural constraints embodied in customs, traditions and codes of 
conduct, they represent the key to explaining the path ofhistorical change"(1990a, p. 6). 
"Path dependency" arises from the type ofknow1edge encouraged and rewarded by the 
institutional environment and hence, the type of knowledge acquired by the 
entrepreneurial firms (ibid, 112). Productive knowledge that encourages entrepreneurial 
spirit and innovation will lead to efficient economic outcomes. Knowledge of learning to 
be better pirates under an institutional environment that encourages redistributive versus 
productive activities will lead to inefficient path dependent outcomes. North considers the 
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formation of path dependency directly related to the initial institutional framework. In the 
case of developing countries, 
the initial set of institutions that provide disincentives to productive activity will 
create organizations and interest groups with a stake in the existing constraints. 
They will shape the polity in their interests. Such institutions provide incentives 
that may encourage military domination of the polity and economy, religious 
fanaticism, or plain, simple redistributive organizations, but they provide few 
rewards from increases in the stock and dissemination of economically useful 
knowledge. The subjective mental constructs of the participants will evolve an 
ideology that not only rationalizes the society's structure but accounts for its 
poor performance. As a result the economy will evolve policies that reinforce 
the existing incentives and organizations (North, 1990a, p. 99). 
The resultant "path dependence" of these economies comes from the "increasing returns 
mechanisms" described above that reinforce the direction once a given path is established 
(North, 1990a, p. 112). In conclusion, for North, developing countries failure to reach the 
economic level of the developed ones is not to be explained by external factors but by 
history and endogenous institutional factors (Collard, 1995). 
From a practical point of view it is essential to determine what kinds of policies or 
phenomena can cause a positive tum around situation in relatively less efficient 
economies of the developed countries or in the inefficient dependency paths of 
developing countries. In North's opinion, technological change and innovation play a 
fundamental role in development by drastically reducing the level of transaction costs 
(North, 1990a). Policies that stimulate innovation- like education and research - and, 
more important, policies that facilitate the import and assimilation of new advanced 
technology from developed countries- like liberalization of trade and investment- are 
fundamental. Hence, changes in the institutional environment coming from an efficiently 
reformed polity are in most cases necessary but as North remarks, "we know very little 
about how to create such polities" (North, 1995, p. 366) as "we do not know how to 
create adaptive efficiency in the short run" (ibid. p. 367). What we do know however is 
55 
that "one gets efficient institutions by a polity that has built-in incentives to create and 
enforce efficient property rights" (North, 1990a, p. 140). 
An analysis of the incentive structure embedded in the polity goes back to the 
organizational perspective on institutions as governance structures having a life of their 
own (Williamson, 1996). Williamson's analysis at the level of institutional arrangements 
claims to bring relevant answers to these issues of development and reform (Williamson, 
1996). The relative efficiency of different institutional arrangements is assessed based on 
three efficiency criteria: "adaptability", "bureaucracy" and "incentive intensity"(ibid., p. 
151 ). The capacity of an institution to adapt to change can take two forms . The first is the 
"autonomous adaptation" which describes spontaneous change via spontaneous 
institutional arrangements (markets or the price system). The second is the "cooperative 
adaptation" which describes coordinated, strategic change via intentional institutional 
arrangements (hybrids and hierarchies) (ibid., p. 103). The market is superior to hierarchy 
in respect to autonomous adaptation but inferior in respect to cooperative adaptation as 
asset specificity, and hence bilateral dependency, becomes more consequential. When 
bilaterally dependent parties are unable to autonomously adapt in a time efficient and 
hazard mitigating efficient way, because of disagreements and self-interested bargaining, 
the need for coordinated adaptation via firms or hybrids arises (Williamson, 1996). The 
transfer of such transactions, from the realm of the markets to the realm of firms, creates 
added bureaucratic costs. But if the cost of transactions that go through the market can be 
thought of as the "cost of using the price mechanism" (Coase, 1937, p. 390), the 
bureaucratic cost can be thought of as the "cost of utilizing the right to give orders" 
(Furubotn & Richter, 1992, p. 10). Bureaucracy represents the equivalent mechanism for 
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hybrid and hierarchy that the market finds in the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith or in the 
marvel of the price mechanism. The market however is characterized by higher incentive 
intensity than hierarchy as a result of subsequent agency problems under the latter mode 
of organization. Incentive intensity is: 
a measure of the degree to which a party reliably appropriates the net receipts (which 
could be negative) associated with its efforts and decisions. High powered incentives 
will obtain if a party has a clear entitlement to and can establish the magnitude of its 
net receipts easily. Low-powered obtain if the net receipts are pooled and/or if the 
magnitude is difficult to ascertain (Williamson, 1996, p. 378). 
Markets and hierarchies are the polar opposite modes of organization with the hybrid 
mode located between the two in all efficiency criteria respects. Hybrid "is characterized 
by semi-strong incentives, an intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, displays 
semi-strong adaptation of both kinds, and works out of a semi-legalistic contract law 
regime" (Williamson, 1996, p. 105). As compared with the market it "sacrifices 
incentives in favor of superior coordination among the parts. As compared with the 
hierarchy, the hybrid sacrifices cooperativeness in favor of greater incentive intensity" 
(ibid., p. 107). As Ramstad (1996) points out, Williamson concentrates on the governance 
structure implications for transactions costs and on the contracting problems that will be 
encountered in achieving transaction cost economizing. His theory is 
centered first, on governance of various types ofbargaining transaction via the 
market (price mediated transactions) and relational contracting (transactions 
mediated by means of a negotiated procedure) and, second, on the conversion of 
bargaining transactions into managerial transactions (intra-fmn, command-mediated 
transactions) (Ramstad, 1996, p. 2). 
Hence, Williamson's analysis emphasizes his efforts to create a theory of the firm 
not as a production unit (neoclassical sense), but as a governance structure. "Throughout, 
the objective is to show how specific types of arrangements manifest the general rule that 
the governance procedures are efficient solutions to the problem of transacting cost 
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minimization" (Ramstad, 1996, p. 2). As a general rule, as societies develop and 
economies become more complex, asset specificity builds up and hybrids and hierarchy 
are more efficient solutions than markets . "Problems with markets arise as bilateral 
dependencies, and the need for cooperative adaptations, builds up" (Williamson, 1996, p. 
237). Within hybrids and hierarchies, private or private-public institutional arrangements 
are superior to public institutional arrangements in all efficiency criteria respects. In 
terms of incentive intensity, private property is advantageous largely because when 
contract enforcement is costly, ownership aligns with individual incentives (Furubotn & 
Richter, 1997). In terms ofbureaucracy and adaptability, public institutions are closely 
related to political markets and hence to the initial institutional framework. In 
Williamson' words: "Were it not that systems drifted away from their initial conditions, 
efforts to replicate markets within hierarchies (or the reverse) and selectively intervene 
would be much easier-in which event differences between organization forms would 
diminish" (Williamson, 1996, p. 240). 
6. Conclusions and implications for economic development and reform 
For Williamson, NIE is an "exercise in comparative institutional analysis, in 
which the efficacy of alternative modes of organization - markets, hybrids, hierarchies, 
public bureaus - are examined in relation to and aligned with the attributes of 
transactions" (Williamson, 1996, p. 327). Paraphrasing Williamson, for North, NIE is an 
exercise in comparative institutional analysis, in which the efficacy of different social 
contracts - in developed and developing countries - are examined in relation to and 
aligned with the attributes of transactions. In conclusion, both authors apply the same 
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theoretical logic in which transaction is the basic unit of analysis, contract is the main 
instance of an institution (viewed as either an institutional environment or an institutional 
arrangement) and minimizing transaction costs is the main cause for the emergence and 
efficient development of institutions. This is the core NIE logic and it departs from NEO 
in three main respects. 
First, by conceptualizing institutions as contracts NIE blurs away a clear 
distinction between economics and politics. NIE recognizes that public sector 
bureaucracies are different in kind from the private ones. This is partly because the 
transactions that are assigned to the public sector are different, in general being 
characterized by higher transaction costs than commercial transactions (North, 1990b). 
Additionally, public sector bureaucracies are shaped by politics (Williamson, 1996). But 
although politics is different it is not as though there is no private sector counterpart 
(ibid.). Hence, "there is no reason why we cannot or should not extend the analysis of 
pricing and contractual arrangements to problems of a larger scale, in particular by 
treating the constitution of a country as a contract and the state as a giant firm" (Cheung, 
1998, p. 520). This modification of the NEO paradigm to cover political issues has 
profound implications for policy making in the field of economic development and 
reform. For example, one can argue for private contractual arrangements based on 
financial incentives and profit maximizing rationale for virtually any aspect traditionally 
covered by the public sector like health, education, environment, culture or legislative 
processes. The corporatization of the public realm is justified in NIE on the grounds of 
relative institutional efficiency. In NIE, the modem capitalist corporation has grown to 
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have a life of its own borrowing some traditional state-like functions and hence, carving 
its own space in the state sovereignty. 
Second, ifNEO views TNCs more like firms acting in a monopolistic anti-
competitive way, NIE views the modern corporation more like a market (Williamson, 
1996). The TNC internalizes transactions from the realm of the market for efficiency 
purposes. Hence, it should be viewed not as a monopolistic economic agent but as an 
alternative market for delivering, goods, services, funds , jobs and know-how. This 
reconceptualization of competition - a TNC competes with a market rather than with 
other firms within a market - has profound policy implications. It can advocate, for 
example, mergers and acquisitions and down play the possible crowding-out effect on 
smaller-size firms in the host countries for TNCs. 
Third, NIE explains the persistent development gap between developing and 
developed countries as a result of endogenous factors (North, 1990a). Inefficient 
domestic institutions, ideologies and mental models lead to underdevelopment and path 
dependency. The direct policy implication is that development does not arise 
automatically as assumed by NEO. Developing countries need to mirror not only the 
economic but also the institutional system of the developed countries, should they want to 
succeed in closing the development gap. Overall, there is a tendency to rank private 
property rights and private firms and arrangements (hybrids and hierarchy) as the 
institutions most enhancing of economic development and hence, the most efficient. 
Reforming developing countries' legal and judicial systems based on developed countries 
models is a necessary condition for the creation of the enabling institutional environment 
for economic growth. This process has to be combined with the reform of developing 
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countries' production systems, most of them functioning on public institutional 
arrangements. 
In terms of the relevance of the NIE policy implications for the MAl's possible 
implications for developed and developing countries, as it will be shown in the next 
chapter, Williamson's work seems more relevant for informing the state/firm debate (will 
MAl decrease the sovereignty of states in the favor of corporations?). North's work 
seems more relevant for informing the developed/developing countries debate (is MAl a 
lever for constraining developing countries in their integration into the global economy?). 
The marvel of the NIE is that it informs these debates from a different, realistic if you 
want, perspective. The point of the discussion for new institutionalists is not which side 
in these debates is wrong or right. For NIE the feared results by the MAl critics are 
already happening, and hence, the critics are right. The new point of discussion becomes: 
are these transformations good or not for economic efficiency and development? Are they 
malign or benign (efficient) adaptations of the economic system to the characteristics of 
modem capitalism? 
The novelty as well as the mainstream academic and political acceptance of the 
NIE is based on NIE's extension of the NEO to answer these particular questions itself. 
As it will be showen in the next chapter, NIE's ideas are used not only to explain the 
emergence ofTNCs and the role ofFDI but also to integrate these explanations into a 
comprehensive institutional theory of global development and reform. Such a theory 
reinforces the need for a global institutional framework of the world economy in which 
all countries, particularly the developing ones, stand to gain from global rules on trade 
and investment that secure and facilitate the foreign transactions of TNCs. 
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Chapter four: NIE, a possible theoretical foundation for the MAl 
1. Introduction 
As presented in chapter three, the debates on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI)'s policy implications can be organized on two main issues. The first 
issue, the state/firm debate, has focused on the transfer of sovereignty between nation 
states and the modem corporation. The second issue, the state/state debate, focused on the 
decreasing sovereignty and political flexibility of the developing countries in formulating 
their own development strategy. New Institutional Economics (NIE) does not debate 
these transformations but rather views them as efficient adaptations of the economic 
system to the characteristics of modem capitalism. The reconceptualization of the 
modem firm as an efficient alternative mechanism for governance - in respect to the 
nation state - and for production and trade - in respect to the market, explains why a 
transfer of sovereignty from the nation state to TNC is economically efficient. The 
adaptation ofNIE's logic to construct a global theory of development and reform explains 
why developing countries might benefit from less flexibility by locking-in reforms 
through agreements with developed countries. Sections 2.1. and 2.2 below look in more 
detail at the commonalties between NIE's and MAl's possible practical implications. 
Assuming that the main MAl debates would resurface in any analysis of future global 
rules on FDI, this analysis is relevant for both MAl and future rules on FDI. Section 3 
traces the influence of the NIE on the official discourse on development, reform and FDI 
in support for arguing that NIE is a possible theoretical foundation for the MAl. Finally, 
section 4 draws some conclusions and implications for the study of MAl and future 
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global treaties on foreign investment. The limitations of this study are discussed and areas 
for future related research are proposed. 
2. The commonalties between NIE's and MAl's possible practical implications 
2.1. The state/firm debate 
The preamble section of the MAl text reflects the belief of the Contracting Parties 
that international investment assumes a greater importance in the world economy and that 
multilateral rules on investment are needed to complement the world trading system. NIE 
is relevant here in that it stresses that coordinating institutions are intrinsic to any 
development process 1• The MAl is an international institution fundamental for the 
development of the global economy, because, as NIE explains, the current face of the 
global economy does not reflect an NEO image of perfect markets but a nexus of firms 
and their investments with foreign direct investment (FDI) gaining an increasing 
developmental role. 
The preamble also reflects the belief that MAl is an efficient institution for 
economic development by locking-in effective global standards for the liberalization of 
investment regimes and protection, and effective dispute settlement procedures (OECD, 
1998a). Many critics disagree. They interpret the preamble to the MAl text as positioning 
private property rights above environmental, social, labor or constitutional rights. The 
MAl provisions would prevail, even in cases when they would appear, for some analysts, 
as inconsistent with legitimate environmental, labor, or other development policies. 
NIE' s policy recommendations for development and reform are relevant here in that they 
emphasize secure property rights as the most important component of an institutional 
1 As opposed to NEO which assumes that growth and development arise from the unharnessed game of 
market forces . 
63 
environment for successful development. For North, "the history of the world .. .is really a 
series of illustrations of the alleged explanatory power of institutions and especially of 
property rights" (Leys, 1996, p. 99). 
The scope section of the Agreement establishes how broadly or narrowly the 
Agreement is to be interpreted. The application of a broad definition of investment raised 
concerns about equating investment rules across fields like health, education, culture, and 
financial markets. Similarly, the application of a broad definition of investor raised 
concerns about equating legal rights across economic agents like public bureaus, private 
and not-for profit organizations. NIB's equal treatment of alternative institutions as 
contracts supported by incentives explains the logic of common treatment across various 
institutional environments or arrangements. As explained in chapter three, the NIE blurs 
away a clear distinction between economics and politics and for that matter between the 
private and public realms. The corporatization of the public realm via privatization or 
contracting out of services in the fields of health, education, protection of environment or 
culture, traditionally provided by the state, is justified in NIE on the grounds of relative 
institutional efficiency. Private contractual arrangements based on financial incentives 
and a profit-maximizing rationale should compete with public contractual arrangements 
based on subsidized incentives and a redistributive rationale. 
From a functionalist point of view, an efficiency argument based on NIE logic can 
be made for introducing competition between different economic agents involved in 
providing services across diverse economic sectors. The issues at stake in the MAl 
debates however, stands for more than that. The transfer of the production and 
distribution of certain transactions from the public to the private realm also involves a 
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transfer of sovereignty and power from the nation state to the modern corporation. The 
issues at stake are in the negotiations of rules for opening up competition between the 
nation state and the modern transnational corporation not just in the production and 
distribution of goods and services, but also in the production and distribution of rights in 
a society. The MAl provides corporations with rights while simultaneously imposing 
obligations on nation states to refrain from constraining these rights. 
The obligations and dispute settlement sections of the Agreement reflect the 
specific obligations that governments have regarding the treatment of foreign investors, 
and the mechanisms for enforcing these obligations. The main logic of these sections of 
the Agreement is to provide a complex legal instrument of constraint. The intention is to 
constrain the legislative power from controlling foreign investors' decisions in 
economically inefficient ways. The instrument works by (i) changing the incentive set 
that underlies governments' policy decisions, (ii) providing an effective mechanism for 
assuring protection and reducing uncertainty, and (iii) providing an effective lock-in 
mechanism for liberalization and protection of investment regimes. 
As presented in chapter two, the obligations of the Contracting states in the 
agreement to: 
( 1) treat the foreign investors in a non-discriminatory way in respect to privatization, to 
the creation, maintenance, or elimination of monopolies, in the granting of 
concessions and investment incentives (relative standards of treatment); 
(2) hold themselves from imposing any performance requirements - as a condition for the 
establishment, acquisition or disposition of an investment or from expropriating 
current or future benefits from investments (absolute standards of treatment); 
65 
(3) restrict their control on the capital account (financial services provisions); 
(4) list all the non-conforming measures and exceptions to the agreement (national 
reservations provisions), refrain from newer or more restrictions (standstill principle) 
and eliminate them over a determined period of time (roll-back principle); 
(5) accept an investor-state arbitration mechanism for the settling of disputes arising out 
ofthis agreement; and finally, to 
(6) be bound to the MAl provisions for 20 years after accession (withdrawal provision), 
raised serious questions about the possible loss of state sovereignty in favor of 
corporations. All national governments currently use some form of these policy tools in 
coordinating development. The idea of the MAl however, is not to open a trial race 
against all government measures but to make sure governments' incentives to engage in 
"unfair expropriations" of any kind from foreign investors are systematically reduced. 
Under the MAl any measure that might affect an asset of the foreign investors can be 
legally challenged and can result in awards of full and immediate compensation. As the 
Ethyl vs. the Government of Canada case has shown (see chapter two), the value of 
claims arising from dispute settlements can be a powerful tool in reducing governments' 
incentives to engage in any harmful practices against foreign investors. 
Critics pointed out that governments may be forced to rent back jurisdiction by 
paying compensation to do what they were elected to do (Appleton, 1998). The NIE 
discourse is relevant here in that it emphasizes that this transfer of power is economically 
efficient. The incentives underlying governments' actions are not necessarily 
economically efficient. The government is using its power to maximize its revenue by 
trading protection and justice with different interest groups (North, 1990b ). Built-in 
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mechanisms of self-restraint are therefore necessary for ensuring that the state would 
submit to economic efficiency and promotes an efficient institutional framework for 
development. The institutional framework further determines the incentive structure to 
which the economic actors respond and the way they function in the economy. Protective 
or subventionist measures like the differential treatment of foreign and domestic investors 
leads to the emergence of inefficient economic organizations and hence, 
underdevelopment (North, 1990a). 
The MAl provides a mechanism of secure protection by delegating the right of 
governments to decide which development policies are appropriate for other economic 
agents. The IMF, not the national governments, would decide which monetary policies 
are considered appropriate development policies. Similarly foreign investors and TNCs 
would decide which government measures interfering with their activities can constitute 
legitimate development policies and which might constitute indirect expropriation. It has 
been argued, for example, that by defining expropriation to include indirect 
expropriations the MAl opens a new door for foreign investors to extend th.e battle over 
expropriations outside normal political and legal processes, where at least both sides have 
the right to be heard, into the one-sided MAl system (Durbin, 1997). 
NIE's reconceptualization of the firm reveals particular insights for this type of 
debate. In NIE the modem corporation has grown to have a life of its own, borrowing 
some traditional state-like functions and hence, carving out its own space in the state's 
sovereignty. "To Williamson, although he does not say so explicitly, the modem 
corporation has become state-like in its functions . It is no longer just a firm, but 
something more- much more" (Dugger 1990, p. 428.). Hence, NIE is advocating the 
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transfer of the management and governance of certain transactions from the realm of the 
state to the realm of the corporation for efficiency purposes. 
Providing firms with the right of directly taking a government to court obviously 
involves a transfer of sovereignty and power from the realm of the state to the realm of 
the corporation. A better idea of the magnitude of this phenomena is obtained however, 
by analyzing the characteristics of the modem corporations that conduct today's FDI 
transactions. The empirical data presented in the first chapter showed a highly 
concentrated universe ofTNCs in which the largest 100 TNCs control about one third of 
the worlds' FDI and are associated with about two thirds of all international transactions. 
In this sense, one can argue that a better description of the transfer of sovereignty is a 
transfer between national states and a few big TNCs. Further, around 60 per cent of the 
TNCs activities are M&A as opposed to greenfield investments. This describes a further 
trend towards greater centralization of governance and corporate power. In this sense one 
can argue that, with his theory, "Williamson is trying to shrink state sovereignty to 
protect the transactions of the powerful" (Dugger, 1996, p. 427). However, in NIE logic 
this transfer of sovereignty is as economically efficient as the emergence of the TNC 
itself. For Williamson "the modem corporation is first and foremost an efficiency 
instrument ... [efficiency purposes being] served by granting corporations considerable 
latitude to craft cost effective internal structures" (Williamson, 1993, p. 53). 
Williamson advocates the legalization of non-market arrangements of 
conglomerate corporations. Territory and customer restrictions, reciprocal trades, tie-ins, 
vertical and horizontal integration, and other "nonstandard modes of organization" have 
frequently been viewed by the United States' courts as some form of monopolization. 
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Williamson objects and argues that such practices should not be viewed exclusively 
through the inhospitable lens of antitrust as they could represent new forms of transaction 
cost economizing (Dugger, 1996). In his opinion, the state should change its biased 
antitrust policy and recognize the modem corporation not as a monopolistic economic 
agent but as an alternative mode of organization acting in an efficient, and hence 
competitive, way (Williamson, 1996). The implications of the MAl or similar future 
agreements on foreign investment on the relative balance of power between nation states 
and TNCs will also depend on the evolution of international rules on antitrust policy and 
on the influence ofNIE on such developments2 . 
Finally, the MAl provides an effective lock-in mechanism for the liberalization 
and protection of investment regimes through the standstill, roll-back and withdrawal 
provisions. By listing all their national reservations, governments would have to expose 
all explicit and implicit existing policies that, if not eliminated in the future, could be 
challenged at a latter date under the MAl. The withdrawal provision assures compliance 
with the provisions of the agreement for a minimum of 20 years after adoption. Hence, no 
electoral or other political changes could affect the continuous liberalization and 
protection of the investments. Some critics argue that this lock-in mechanism would 
constrain countries towards one model of development, the most liberal one. NIE's 
discourse is relevant here in that it emphasizes the importance of path-dependency in 
2 The effect ofNIE's ideas on the U.S. antitrust policy were summarized by Williamson as follows: "there 
is growing agreement that antitrust would not have been reformed but for the development of the new 
theory. The differences between the 1968 and the 1982 merger guidelines of the United States Department 
of Justice evidence some of the changes that resulted from the paradigm shift away from the market power 
(monopolizing) in favor of efficiency (economizing)" (Williamson, 1996, p. 281 ). 
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economic history. Changes in incentives and in the institutional structure are path 
dependent. An institutional arrangement or mechanism (like the MAl) "that can affect a 
change in laws or property rights" (Davis & North, 1971, pp. 6-7) requires an extended 
post-contractual period of secured enforcement for breaking inefficient dependency-
paths. 
In conclusion, NIE discourse justifies the transfer of sovereignty and power from 
the nation state to the modem corporation as a result of MAl implementation on 
economic efficiency arguments. However, as the state/state debates have shown in 
chapter two, strong developed states (such as the OECD states) gain an increasing role in 
development as guarantors of credible commitments for developing countries. 
2.2. The state/state debate 
As presented in chapter one of this thesis there was a general recognition between 
the MAl negotiators that the MAl or future similar agreements would constitute sensiti·;e 
issues to bring to the negotiating table with the developing countries. All the possible 
implications analyzed in the previous debate are magnified for developing countries. The 
increased sensitivity in negotiations, results from the general perception that developing 
states need more flexibility in development policy-making to be able to react to the 
current dynamics of the forces of globalization. A decrease in the sovereignty and 
political flexibility of the developing countries in drawing their own development 
strategy would seem for some to affect the governments needing it the most. 
The NIE discourse is relevant here in that it explains that "fewer degrees of 
freedom (rules) can have advantages over more (discretion) because added credible 
commitments can obtain in this way. Effective economic reform thus requires that 
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political reneging options be foreclosed if investor confidence is to be realized" 
(Williamson, 1996, p. 268). In the case of developing countries, NIE argues, public 
bureaucracies are particularly bad in terms of incentives that underlie their policy 
decisions and hence, their economic outcomes. By signing long-term agreements, they 
are able to signal credible commitments and gain investors' confidence. MAl's strong 
focus on investors' rights and states' obligations, as opposed to a more balanced 
treatment, mirrors the underlying logic of the Agreement as a protection tool against 
government bureaucracy's opportunism. A similar logic underlies NIE's support for 
governments' focus on creating efficient (i.e., private) property rights as opposed to 
direct involvement in the production area. 
The critics' concerns with possible cultural threats for developing countries finds 
an interesting response in NIE's logic. Throughout his work North insists on the 
importance of cultural constraints for the formation and evolution of economic inefficient 
path dependency. The right type ofknowledge, which is, mostly technological knowledge 
and 'know-how', not only receives a higher attached value in terms of its effects on 
economic development, but sometimes it is posited against other types of local 
knowledge that can inherently influence wrong mental models and ideologies. Further, 
the 20 years lock- in condition can be interpreted as not just signaling long-term credible 
commitments but also signaling a mechanism for penalizing wrong macro-ideologies for 
efficiency purposes. As North (1990a) points out, for assuring a shorter life of inefficient 
dependency paths, institutional mechanisms should be devised to penalize historically 
proven wrong macro-ideologies. As NIE explains, the persistent development gap 
between developed and developing countries is a direct result of endogenous factors 
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(North, 1990a). Inefficient domestic institutions, ideologies and subjective mental models 
lead to underdevelopment and inefficient path dependency. Development does not arise 
automatically as assumed by NEO models. Developing countries need to mirror not only 
the economic system but also the institutional system of the developed countries if they 
want to succeed in closing the development gap. 
3. Tracing the influence of the NIE on the official discourse on development and 
reform 
Chapter one of this thesis looked at NIE's influence on current theories ofFDI 
and trade. It pointed out how NIE's modifications ofNEO led to revisions in the way 
international trade and investment theorists explore the role of flows of international 
capital in today's world economy. The industrial organization school based on NIE ideas 
criticizes the 'old' international school based on NEO which fails to acknowledge the 
distinction between flows of factors of production in the form of FDI, and flows of goods 
and services in the form of trade. The argument at stake is that TNCs are choosing more 
FDI over trade mechanisms in serving foreign markets, for transaction costs efficiency 
purposes. Hence, global rules governing FDI are necessary to complement the current 
WTO program ofbuilding global rules for trade. As the empirical trends presented in 
Chapter one shows however, the growth ofFDI and of the TNCs are challenging national 
states control in both the production and governance arena and nation states' sovereignty. 
The reality oftoday's world economy shows a persistent economic disparity 
between developed and developing countries. One can question, then, the exact relation 
between global rules on FDI and the development process. NIE shows that arguments for 
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global rules ofFDI can be made also from a larger perspective in which FDI are venues 
for development and reform between countries at different levels of development. 
Current attempts of incorporating these theoretical perspectives into a new development 
paradigm are in this sense relevant for analyzing NIE as a possible theoretical foundation 
for the MAl. 
In their role as the World Bank's annual intellectual flagship publication, the 
World Development Reports (WDRs) have, for more than 20 years, reflected the official 
mainstream discourse on development and reform. Traditionally addressing developing 
countries, WDRs ' analysis and policy recommendations for economic reforms have also 
become relevant for developed countries, particularly to the ones implementing economic 
reforms ofthe public sector. As Leys (1996) points out in his account ofthe "rise and fall 
of development theory", 
since the late 1960s, the debate about 'development theory' has in fact been more 
and more clearly about the theory of global development that each one presupposed, 
although the participants have all too often not recognized, or not acknowledged, 
that this was the issue at stake (Leys, 1996, p. 43). 
If, until the first part of 1980 NEO was the ruling philosophy of the World Bank, 
the 1987 WDR marked the shift towards a NIE approach. The report, which focused on 
foreign trade and industrialization, relied explicitly on North and cited his comparison of 
the contrasting development paths of the U.K. and Spain as support for its emphasis on 
the need for governments to concentrate on establishing clear private property rights 
rather than involve themselves in productive activities and for opening up to trade and 
foreign investment in order to introduce the right economic incentives for economic 
growth. 
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The 1994 WDR "Infrastructure for Development" relied heavily on Williamson's 
analysis ofthe relative efficiency of different institutional arrangements for its emphasis 
on the need for governments to contract out or privatize the distribution and management 
of infrastructure services like transportation, electric power, telecommunications, water 
and sanitation, and waste disposal, traditionally provided and managed by public bureaus. 
The report's insistence on the need to "manage infrastructure more like a business than a 
bureaucracy" (World Bank, 1994, p. 2) and to introduce competition in the provision of 
these services from domestic and foreign private firms led some to the conclusion that 
"the report's treatment of the issues at stake as if they were purely 'technical', by 
excluding crucial political and social considerations is patently ideological" (Leys, 1996, 
p. 91). 
The preference for a NIE functional conceptualization of the institutions of the 
state continued in the 1997 WDR "The State in a Changing World" which addressed 
more comprehensively the role of the state in development. As Kapur (1997, p. 8) 
pointed out "a more curious aspect of the [1997] WDR's conception of the state is the 
virtual absence of politics in an analysis of an entity whose very essence is political." The 
basic message of the report is that a state's role must match its capability. The state must 
focus on social and economic fundamentals of which a foundation of law and property 
rights is the most important one. Only states with strong capacity should consider 
industrial policy objectives. States with weak capability - defined as a characteristic of 
most of the developing states - should focus on fundamentals as well as on increasing 
their institutional capabilities. The latter can be realized by enhancing liberalization and 
decentralization, which is, by contracting out productive activities to the private sector. 
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Signaling credible commitments, like signing international agreements for monitoring 
liberalization can also temporarily increase the capabilities of the weak states. Shortly, 
the state has to open itself up to competition in both the production and the governance 
arena. 
The 1998/99 WDR "Knowledge for Development" worked out of the same 
theoretical framework. The Report explored the role ofknowledge in explaining the 
development gap between developed and developing countries. While recognizing that 
there are many different types of knowledge the report focused on two types: technical 
knowledge or know-how (about production, accounting) and knowledge about attributes 
(the quality of goods and services, the diligence of a worker). It proposed a two pronged 
strategy. One strategy is to narrow knowledge gaps between developed and developing 
countries. This focuses on acquiring efficient economic knowledge, which is technical 
knowledge, from richer countries. Governments should facilitate this process through an 
open trading system, foreign investment and partnerships with the TNCs: 
Improving policy and business environment .. . is one of the most important ways 
for countries to obtain knowledge from abroad. Openness to foreign direct investment 
goes hand in hand with an open trade regime, and it provides benefits for the acquisition 
of knowledge in its right. Because multinational investors are global leaders in 
innovations, their activities in developing countries can be important in transmitting 
knowledge. (World Bank, 1998, p. 8) 
The second strategy is to address problems of imperfect and incomplete information, 
which hamper development. The Report explains how information problems impede the 
efficient functioning of markets and also challenge the ability ofthe governments to deal 
with these problems taking into consideration that governments also suffer from 
problems of information failures or corruption. Again the underlining message is that 
governments should focus on establishing a secure institutional environment for markets 
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to be able to function while contracting much of the production functions to a more 
incentive efficient institutional arrangement like the private sector3. 
Finally, the most recent 1999 WDR "Entering the 21st Century" draws on both 
Williamson and North to argue for new institutional reforms by national governments 
needed in a globalizing and localizing world. Globalization - the progressive integration 
of the world's economies- requires national governments to seek agreements with other 
national governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and 
transnational corporations through supranational institutions. Localization - the growing 
desire of people for a greater say in their governments- requires governments to reach 
agreements with regions and cities through subnational institutions. The most important 
forces behind globalization and localization are trade, capital flows, urbanization and 
migration. The need for agreements that facilitate trade and FDI is a recurrent policy 
recommendation for governments in harnessing these forces. 
As the Report points out, with the increasing role of the TNCs and of the 
international production networks that sustain their operations, trade and investment -
particularly trade in services - are becoming fundamentally intertwined. The continuation 
of global trade transactions would require complementary FDI rules to secure the 
operations of the TNCs. "The new production networks thrive on- indeed they expect-
stable, predictable trade and investment policies" (World Bank, 1999, p. 66). To 
continue or increase the pace of modernization, industrialization and urbanization 
developing countries will need huge injections of capital. With the recent East Asian 
financial crises caused by volatile short-term capital flows, FDI becomes a more stable 
attractive source for finance . 
3 See for example, p.149 
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Along with goods, services and investment between 2 million and 3 million 
people emigrate each year, the majority going to just four host countries: United States, 
Germany, Canada and Australia. By accelerating growth, and expanding better-paid 
employment opportunities within TNCs, FDI can reduce incentives to emigrate. TNCs 
can also effect repatriation of highly skilled emigrants. 
A country that adopts measures to enhance foreign direct investment and integrates 
with global production networks by maintaining low and predictable trade barriers 
will fmd that doing so generates additional benefits. If the quality and technological 
sophistication of a developing country's exports increase, highly skilled emigrants 
may decide to return. (World Bank, 1999, p. 39) 
In case emigrants decide not to return to their home countries, diasporas can serve as 
another source of global interconnection between these countries and the rest of the 
world. Countries "with large and growing emigrant communities scattered throughout the 
world will have the opportunity to tap into the development potential of their diasporas" 
(World Bank, 1999, p. 40). However, "as long as economies remain inwardly oriented, 
predisposed to regulating business activities, and prone to arbitrary actions, diasporas 
may not be able to evolve into business networks that strengthen markets and prod 
development" (ibid.). Openness towards foreign markets and investors and stable 
protecting FDI legislation is again a requirement. 
Although the WDRs analyzed above tend to be subject specific, there are some 
common underlying themes. In terms of policy recommendations the options differ 
depending on the institutional capacity of the national government. Weak governments -
most of developing countries - should compete with other institutional arrangements in 
both the production and governance areas. In production, public bureaus should be 
privatized or behave more like businesses than bureaucracies, and compete on equal 
playing fields with private organizations. In the governance area, weak governments 
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should restrain from conducting industrial policy. Opening markets to competition, trade 
and FDI is fundamental for changing the inefficient incentive sets imbedded in the weak 
institutional framework. Enforcing the rules is as important as creating good rules. Weak 
states lack efficient institutions of restraint. As the process of changing incentives and of 
learning new knowledge takes time, signing international agreements with strong states 
can serve as external institutional arrangements for signaling credible commitments and 
for reducing uncertainty by locking in economic and political reforms. In the case of 
strong states, it is indirectly implied that they should represent examples of "best 
practices" of successful economic and political systems and that they should help weak 
states in closing the knowledge and development gap through international institutions 
and agreements in which they are the major stakeholders. 
No national government however, weak or strong, can in today's globalizing and 
localizing world pursue independent, uncoordinated development policies. A global 
economy, like a national one, needs an institutional framework and institutional 
arrangements or orgal(lizations to support its international functioning. The conceptual 
analysis of past attempts for such a global treaty, like the MAl, and of the main 
theoretical framework that underlies its logic are important for understanding the building 
process of the future fully integrated global economy. 
A closer look at the underlying conceptual theoretical framework of the WDRs 
points to the NIE as the latest development paradigm used to explain and coordinate this 
process. Sections (3 .1.) to (3 .4.) below present a more detailed analysis of the influence 
of the NIE ideas in the past WDRs. 
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3.1. The paradigm shift 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main objective of the NIE is to inject a 
theory of institutions into mainstream neoclassical economics. The main theoretical 
questions NIE is addressing deal with the concept, purpose and role of institutions in 
development. Overall, the purpose is to compare different institutional environments and 
different institutional arrangements and to argue that there are good reasons to favor one 
type of institution over another based on their relative efficiency in inducing 
development. The 1997 WDR explains the shift in the official discourse of the past 
WDRs to this new paradigm: 
Despite five decades of effort, enormous disparities remain in the quality of life of 
people around the world. Indeed by some measures the gap between rich and poor 
has widened. Explanations for these huge international differences in living standards 
have changed over the years. For centuries, access to natural resources-land and minerals-
was considered the prerequisite to development. .. [then]. .. physical capital-machines 
and equipment-was held to be the key to development. .. [then] ... technology-knowledge 
and ideas- ... [then] ... human capital[ . . . ] Since the 1980s the focus shifted to the role of 
sound policies in explaining why countries accumulate human and physical capital at 
different rates . This, in tum, has lead to yet another shift of focus, to the quality of a 
country's institutions. New, more complex questions have emerged. What institutional 
arrangements best allow markets to flourish? What is the role of the state both as a direct 
agent (mostly in the provision of services) and as a shaper of the institutional context in 
which markets function? How do policies and institutions interact in development? 
The answers to these questions are central to our understanding of the deeper sources of 
differences in development outcomes ... [The purpose is to shift] the focus of our thinking 
about development toward the quality of a country's institutions and the capability of the 
state-for bringing institutions into the mainstream of our dialogue about development. 
(World Bank, 1997, pp. 29-30) 
The recent 1999/2000 WDR that starts with an introduction section on "new 
directions in development thinking" (World Bank, 1999, p. 13) explicitly positions "new 
institutional economics" (ibid., p. 23) at the front stage of its current development 
approach. The new "sectoral" and "structural" guidelines for development add to the well 
known "human and physical aspects of development" dimensions: 
Sectoral aspects stress the importance of cross-cutting elements such as coordination, 
management, and maintenance of an effective enabling environment for private 
business and community initiatives. Structural aspects focus on the need for good 
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governance, transparent decisionrnaking, efficient legal and judicial processes, and 
sound regulatory systems. (World Bank, 1999, p. 3) 
The underlying message is that: 
a solid foundation of effective organizations and enabling institutions is a necessary 
precondition to development' . ... Specifically, countries need institutions that 
strengthen organizations and promote good governance, whether through laws and 
regulations or by coordinating the actions of many players, as international and 
public-private partnerships do. (World Bank, 1999, p. 3) 
3.2. What are 'institutions'? 
The WDRs use the concept of institutions to refer to both the institutional 
framework or to the institutional arrangements. The 1998 WDR, for example, states that: 
"institutions, broadly defined to include governments, private organizations, laws, and 
social norms, contribute to establishing recognized standards and enforcing contracts, 
thus making possible transactions that would otherwise not occur" (World Bank, 1998, p. 
3). NIE defines the institutional environment as "the set of fundamental political, social 
and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution" (Davis & North, 1971, pp. 6-7). They are humanly devised constraints 
composed of formal rules, informal constraints, and the enforcement characteristics of 
both that structure incentives in human exchange. Similarly, the 1998/99 WDR defines 
"the broader institutional environment for behavior [as] the incentive structure to which 
economic agents respond" (World Bank, 1998, p. 32). Elsewhere the same Report states 
that" ... the formal rules-laws and regulations-that are part and parcel of a country's 
institutional environment[ ... ] along with the informal rules of the broader society, are the 
institutions that mediate human behavior" (ibid., p. 30). 
Concerning the "institutional arrangements", NIE defines them as arrangements 
"between economic units that governs the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or 
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compete" (Davis & North, 1971, pp. 6-7). They can provide a "structure within which its 
members can cooperate" or "a mechanism that can effect a change in laws or property 
rights" (ibid.) . Similarly the 1997 WDR points out that in order to "prosper, economies 
need institutional arrangements to resolve disputes among firms, citizens, and 
governments; to clarify ambiguities in laws and regulations; and to enforce compliance. 
Societies have devised a broad array of formal and informal mechanisms to do this" 
(World Bank, 1997, p. 100). Public institutional arrangements have emerged for "setting 
the broader institutional environment for behavior: the incentive structure to which the 
economic agents respond" (ibid. , p. 32). "Private institutional arrangements have evolved 
to restrain opportunism in business dealings, while bypassing court proceedings" (ibid. , 
p. 46). Examples of institutional arrangements analyzed by the WDRs range from "the 
guilds of medieval Europe and the premodern Arab world, long-term trading relationship, 
sharecropping, the interlinking of contracts across markets, permanent labor contracts and 
collateral" (World Bank, 1998, p. 79) to "leasing contract", "concession contract", 
"private ownership and operation" (World Bank, 1994, pp. 110-111). 
Chapter three of this thesis analyzed North's treatment of the institutions of the 
state. The state represents a special institution in that it is the creator and main enforcer of 
the institutional environment. The state represents the third party enforcer of contracts 
between agents without which no complex economic markets can function. At the same 
time, the organization ofthe state is a set of institutional arrangements created to 
facilitate political transactions, which are, exchanges of votes for promises. As an 
organization, the state has a comparative advantage in violence, vis-a-vis other 
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institutional arrangements, and it uses its power to maximize its revenue by trading 
protection and justice with different interest groups. 
The 1997 WDR "The State in a Changing World" which focused on the role of 
the state in development, adopted North' s analysis without qualification. "State, in its 
wider sense, refers to a set of institutions that possess the means of legitimate 
coercion .. . [and that] monopolizes rulemaking within its territory through the medium of 
organized government" (World Bank, 1997, p. 20). The state is the creator and enforcer 
of the institutional environment in which different institutional arrangements emerge: 
"[it] sets the formal rules-laws and regulations-that are part and parcel of a country's 
institutional environment. [ ... ]These formal rules, along with the informal rules of the 
broader society, are the institutions that mediate human behavior" (ibid., p. 30). At the 
same time, the state is an institutional arrangement itself. It shares similar organizational 
and efficiency problems with other institutional arrangements and is influenced by the 
very same institutional environment that it created: "the state is not merely a referee, 
making and enforcing the rules form the sidelines; it is also a player indeed often a 
dominant player, in the economic game. [ ... ] The state, then, is in a unique position: not 
only must it establish, through a social and political process, the formal rules by which all 
other organizations must abide; as an organization itself, it too, must abide by those 
rules" (ibid., pp. 30-31 ). 
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3.3. Why institutions emerge? 
NIE maintains that the basic reasons for the emergence of institutions are 
reducing uncertainty and economizing on transaction costs. Uncertainty in transactions 
exist because of information, coordination and enforcement problems. Information 
problems arise because the goods and services exchanged have complex multiple 
attributes and people have bounded rationality. Coordination and enforcement problems 
exist because of peoples' opportunistic behavior. Institutions emerge to deal with these 
problems and to reduce the transaction costs. The cost of seeking out the right 
information or the cost of enforcing agreements are examples of transaction costs. 
Again, NIE's explanations for the emergence of institutions are clearly mirrored in 
the latest WDRs. Take for example information problems. One report states that: 
"information problems occur because people and firms inevitably have limited 
information and understanding, or because the rules of the game are unclear. [ ... ] The 
costs of seeking out such information decline as markets thicken and their supporting 
institutions develop . .. "(World Bank, 1997, p. 43). Information problems are also 
underpinned by the non-homogeneity of the goods and services exchanged: "a variety of 
institutional arrangements emerges over time in response to verification and enforcement 
problems ... " (World Bank, 1998, p. 79). Verifying "the attributes of a good or service-
the durability of a product, the productivity of a worker" is costly (ibid., p. 73). 
Analysis of coordination and enforcement problems are found in both the 1997 
and the 1998/99 WDR. Similar to NIE, opportunistic behavior plays a major role in 
explaining coordination and enforcement problems: "coordination of economic activity is 
difficult because self interested people and firms behave strategically - they generally are 
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willing to share information only when they do not lose by doing so. The presence of 
moral hazard - the risk that parties might opportunistically renege on agreements - hinder 
firms for taking advantage of opportunities for mutual gain" (World Bank 1997, p. 43). In 
what concerns the "enforcement problem" it refers to the "imperfect monitoring and 
difficulties with ensuring compliance" (World Bank, 1998, p. 75). Spot markets 
(characterized by simultaneous exchange) or small community-type exchange are less 
affected by these problems. In modern economies however, "requiring sophisticated 
transactions over long distances, traditional information mechanisms such as local 
reputation to establish quality or reliability become inadequate" (ibid. , p. 149). For such 
complex transactions "the costs of providing adequate information and enforcement 
mechanisms to enable business to proceed can be formidable. Well functioning 
institutions can reduce these transaction costs" (World Bank, 1997, p. 43). 
3.4. What are the implications for development? 
For NIE, development is a process of interaction between the institutional 
environment (rules) and the institutional arrangements (firms and contracts) that emerge 
as a result of the embedded incentive set. The key connection between the two 
institutional levels - institutional environment and institutional arrangements - is the 
incentive set. The key connection between this mechanism and development is 
transaction costs. 
Inefficient rules form the wrong incentives that lead to higher transaction costs 
and lower levels of total output. Efficient rules create correct incentives that lead to lower 
transaction costs and higher levels of total output. Efficient property rights are the most 
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important component of the institutional environment created by the institutions of state. 
They represent "the foundations for market-led growth and poverty reduction" (World 
Bank, 1997, p. 45). The private sector's ability to function critically depends "on the 
reliability and effectiveness of institutions such as the rule of law and the protection of 
property rights" (ibid., p. 32). However, efficient property rights are not sufficient as 
political and public institutions have an inherent tendency to function inefficiently. "Even 
ifthe rules themselves are benign they might be applied by public organizations-and their 
employees-in harmful fashion" (ibid.) for example by imposing huge transaction costs, in 
the form of red tape and bribery. As a result, the institutions of state should represent an 
efficient institutional arrangement by conducting its functioning more on business than 
bureaucratic principles. Because of path dependency, historical development ofthe 
institutional arrangements is drastically constrained by the initial institutional framework. 
However, under the forces of entrepreneurial spirit and technological change, mutations 
in the institutional arrangements can emerge that fight back for changes in the 
institutional frameworks. As mentioned before, states' policies that focus on facilitating 
trade and FDI are fundamental in this sense. 
Finally, "the largest source of state-inflicted damage is uncertainty" (ibid.) . In 
order to function efficiently, individuals and firms must know that the rules of the game 
are stable and that they will be enforced. Efficient institutions at both national and 
international levels are needed for establishing the foundations for an efficient national 
and international economy. 
The changes in the official discourse on development and reform analyzed above, 
shows NIE's role in the reinterpretation of the development paradigm with FDI and 
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global rules ofFDI playing an increasing developmental role. These developments have 
fundamental implications for national governments' policy making in general and for 
reconsidering the study of MAl or future global treaties on foreign investment in the 
process of development in particular. 
4. Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that NIE is a possible theoretical foundation for the MAl. 
This has been argued by looking at the commonalties in terms ofNIE's and MAl's 
development and policy implications and by looking at the NIE' s contribution to the 
official discourse on development and reform. First, this thesis has showed that the MAl 
and NIE did not develop in a vacuum. They developed as social and intellectual reactions 
for dealing with significant changes in the global economy particularly, the increasing 
importance ofTNCs and ofFDI within the context of persistent disparities between 
countries' levels of economic development. The empirical data on FDI transactions show 
(i) an increasing internationalization of the control of previously domestically controlled 
factors of production; (ii) a shift in the transfer of control of productive assets from the 
developing to the developed world; and (iii) a concentration ofthe control of factors of 
production within large TNCs, during the last decades. The emergence of the NIE and of 
the MAl is connected by a common purpose in theory and practice to explain these 
fundamental transformations of the global economy. 
Second, this thesis has shown that the MAl's logic and policy implications 
directly relate to NIE's recommendations for development and reform. NIE extends the 
NEO program (i) by explaining the emergence of, and need for, firms and institutions for 
86 
economic development and (ii) by explaining the continuous economic disparities 
between developed and developing countries by appeal to endogenous institutional 
factors . NIE's recommendations for the nation state to open itself up to competition both 
in production and governance arenas directly relates with the MAl's state/firm and 
state/state debates. NIE's underlying intellectual task to extend the NEO program to deal 
with issues beyond its ken represents a remarkable theoretical success. The third 
argument of this thesis referred to the successful development ofthe NIE towards a 
global development theory by looking at its influence on the current official discourse on 
development and reform. This thesis has argued NIE has helped redesign the official 
discourse on development and reform with FDI and global rules on investment gaining an 
increasing developmental role. 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on the MAl and NIE in a 
number of ways. It contributes to the MAl literature in four ways. The first contribution 
is underlying the need for clearer identification of the theoretical logic behind the MAl or 
future similar agreements. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, critics and 
opponents of the MAl have been equally unclear on this issue hence, too often, have 
lacked a common language for conducting an open debate. Secondly, different theories 
designed to explain the role ofTNCs and FDI have different implications for policy 
analysis in the field of development and reform. An open recognition of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the MAl or future similar agreements would foster a critical and 
constructive debate. This thesis invites such a debate by arguing that NIE is a possible 
theoretical foundation for the MAL Further research should be conducted on the possible 
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contribution of other theories to the theoretical foundations of the MAl and on the 
relation of these theories with the NIE. 
The second contribution of this thesis to the MAl literature is in its insistence of 
the relevance of the MAl for developing countries. The possible implications of the MAl 
or future similar agreements for developing countries has been less explored by the MAl 
analysts with the attention being focused on the OECD negotiating countries. By drawing 
special attention to this aspect of the debate this thesis intends to contribute to filling this 
void. The analysis in this thesis is however only exploratory. Further comprehensive 
research should be undertaken to identify the possible complex effects of such 
agreements on developing countries. The current study undertaken by UNCTAD (1999) 
on the conceptual issues allowing for a certain flexibility of developing countries 
participating in international investment agreements, in the interest of promoting growth 
and development, represents a positive sign in this sense. 
Future research on the effects of the further liberalization of financial flows for 
developing countries as a result of the MAl or future similar agreements' provisions is 
also imperative, if only, in the light of the recent Asian currency crises. In relation to this, 
further research should be undertaken on the role and possible implications of the current 
attempts to change the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) by-laws to expand its control 
over capital account liberalization. The MAl's financial provisions provide that countries' 
requests to regulate capital outflows in cases of financial crises would require IMF 
approval. The IMF's Articles of the Agreement however, currently apply only to a 
nation's current account transactions. By amending Article VIII and XIV of the Articles 
of Agreement the IMP could expand its control over capital account transactions. 
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The third contribution of this thesis to the MAl literature is in its insistence that if 
MAl-type agreements are to be opposed then they must be opposed not only at the level 
of arguing that the outcomes will be undesirable but also that the underlying theory - in 
this case the NIE - is also flawed. By exposing the theoretical roots of the MAl it is now 
possible to construct alternative theories of the firm and ofFDI flows which would 
permit the development of a quite different constitution for the global economy. 
The fourth contribution of this thesis to the MAl literature is underlining the need 
to analyze the MAl not just as an individual project that could determine the dynamics of 
foreign investment transactions but also as a fundamental part of an ongoing process of 
building a global institutional framework that would determine the distribution of rights 
and power in the global economy. This is important since powerful MAl proponents, like 
the United States and Japan, continue to argue for non-binding environmental, labor or 
other social clauses in an international agreement on foreign investment. The current 
country proposals for negotiating an international agreement on FDI at the WTO reflect 
the difficulties and on-going negotiation for grasping a consensus on these issues. 
Recognizing that MAl-type agreements are still negotiated in different foras and that a 
future agreement on foreign investment will eventually emerge, further research should 
be done on alternative MAl proposals that balance the rights and obligations of the 
TNCs, nation states and citizens by taking in consideration all these specific concerns. 
The recent proposal advanced by Marc Lee (1999) to the British Columbia Special 
Committee on the MAl represents promising research on this direction. In particular, his 
arguments that: 
a fundamental aim of a global investment treaty should be to effectively regulate investment 
and to prevent abuses of power that undermine the livelihoods of people. That is, given that 
production and fmance have become global, there is a need for counterweights at a global 
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level to balance the power of these actors. Measures to deter speculative capital inflows, as 
well as measures to ensure that responsibilities and obligations are specified for longer-term 
investment, are required. (Lee, 1999, p. 2) 
find resonance in the ideas expressed in this thesis. 
This thesis also contributes to the existing body of literature on NIE in two ways. 
First, it advances the argument for a complementary Williamson-North NlE framework. 
This approach does not necessarily dismiss the claims of differences between the two 
theoretical branches of the NlE but it points out that, in some cases, the study of 
institutions can be better informed by a complementary Williamson-North NlE 
framework rather than by the individual work of its parts. This observation is important 
because most of the NlE critics were more concerned with differentiating between the 
two perspectives and failed to recognize the increasing acceptance of a complementary 
NlE perspective in the official discourse on development and reform. Secondly, this 
thesis contributes to the NlE versus NEO debate by analyzing the line of departure 
between the two paradigms in answering fundamental theoretical questions. 
Lastly, but not least, this thesis contributes to the theory and practice of 
international political economy by reinforcing the opinion that dominant social practices 
are sustained and constituted by mainstream theoretical discourses. NlE successfully 
modified the NEO paradigm and subsequently the official discourse on development and 
reform. Any theoretical success, however, has to beweighed against its possible practical 
implications. Strictly speaking NlE is a theory of the firm- its birth, objectives, growth, 
metamorphoses, tools, and power. Its application to other types of organizations, like the 
state, and to development starts from the same logic and represents more or less relaxed 
variations on the same theme. The empirical data presented in Chapter one show that 
from a descriptive point of view, NlE is a better theory in presenting the shifting balance 
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of power between the main actors in the current world order, in redefining the unit of 
analysis and in helping us to see through the eyes of corporate logic. To this end, given 
that current developments will continue to unfold towards a corporate world, this 
theoretical attempt is a useful exercise for understanding the corporate mind and for 
imagining future scenarios with diverse corporate-governments institutional hybrids. 
To MAl's opponents' question 'an international agreement for whom?' MAl's 
proponents answer is clear: MAl is an international law for investment and investors 
(there are other relevant bodies for negotiating labor, environmental and social issues), 
for reducing their uncertainty, and by reducing the trade and investment barriers that they 
face (which add unjustifiable production and transaction costs). Nevertheless, as long as 
theoretical attempts to construct an NIE theory of world development are given ultimate 
recognition in the mainstream intellectual academia and as long as we are told that the 
MAl represents the fundamental piece in writing of the constitution of a single global 
economy, we should analyze both NIE and MAl as global developments that ultimately 
involve and affect all social agents' behavior, choices and rights - be they firms, 
individuals, states or NGOs - and not just the rights of the corporate firm. The MAl 
provisions represent a system of global regulations governing investor and corporate 
rights. The issue is not so much that its legal body does not integrate clear and binding 
provisions on labor, environmental or other human rights or that it might reduce states' 
sovereignty in favor of the corporation - as much of its criticism is focused on. But that 
it provides a mechanism for contracting out some traditional state functions- and with 
these the power and right to decide a certain distribution of rights in society - to the realm 
of corporate governance. All these, in the name of economic, social and political 
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efficiency. To this end we should recognize the prescriptive relationship between the 
theory (NIE) and the social practice (MAl) and its far-reaching implications. 
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